JK 3225 
1842 
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



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CONSIDERATIONS 



RHODE ISLAND QUESTION 



BY EL IS HA B. POTTER 





CONSIDERATIONS 



QUESTIONS 



ADOPTION OF A CONSTITUTION, 



EXTENSION OF SUFFRAGE 






RHODE ISLAND. 



5 



BY ELISHA RT POTTEK 



BOSTON : 

THOMAS H. WEBB & CO. 

1842. 

[reprinted.] 

CENTRAL FALLS, R. I. : 

E . L . FREEMAN & CO., STATE P R I N T BBS. 
1879. 



/?7 






ADVERTISEMENT. 

It has been the intention of the writer, at several different 
times during our recent difficulties, to publish some remarks 
upon the facts and questions at issue between the contending 
parties in this State ; and as, although military force is now no 
longer to be feared, the civil agitation of the controversy will 
probably be continued, and will affect, not only this, but other 
States — the importance of the occasion is deemed a sufficient 
apology for the publication. It is a subject upon which no one 
can pretend to originality of thought, and wherever I have found 
what appeared to me to be common sense, stated in strong and 
forcible language by others, I have used their words, and given 
their names ; for I would rather lose the reputation of originality, 
than in a matter of so great consequence to the public welfare, 
lose the weight of the authority of statesmen and authors of 
well-known and established character, in enforcing the opinions 
I advocate. 

Kingston, E. L, September, 1842. 



Note. — This pamphlet is now reprinted as originally published, without 
any omission or alteration. As it was printed so long ago it may require 
some little knowledge of the political history of the State — more than some 
of our politicians seem to have, to understand some of the allusions and 
references. 

Kingston, September, 1879. 



CONSIDERATIONS 



RHODE ISLAND QUESTION 



Ok reading the remarks made upon the Ehode Island difficul- 
ties in the papers of other States, it is at once apparent to a 
Ehode Islander, that many of the facts are but imperfectly 
understood, even by those who discountenance the revolutionary 
movement. 

The colony of Ehode Island originally consisted of four 
separate settlements or townships. Providence, settled in 1636; 
Portsmouth, March, 1638; Newport, March, 1639; and War- 
wick. The people of these several settlements, formed them- 
selves into political societies by voluntary compacts. And 
afterwards, in 1643-4, Eoger Williams was sent over to England, 
and obtained a patent, uniting them as one colony. This con- 
tinued until 1663, when the charter was obtained from Charles 
II., by which the colony has always since been governed. 

Upon this charter and its history we have several remarks to 
make before proceeding further. 

First, the charter or form of government was the deliberate 
act of the people themselves. It was drawn by agents appointed 
by the colony for that purpose, and sent to England, expressly 
to obtain for it the sanction of the English government. That 
sanction was, of course, necessary to its validity, as we were then 
a colony dependent upon England. 



Second, the charter, when obtained and brought back, was 
formally accepted by a vote of the whole people, assembled to- 
gether, as was then the usage, at Newport. 

The government was, therefore, originally established by vol- 
untary compact of the whole people, and the present form, as 
settled in the charter of 1663, was also solemnly accepted and 
adopted by the people. 

So far as the charter derived its force from the act of the king 
of England, (as the charter of a mere corporation,) it, of course, 
ceased to be of any binding force after the revolution of 1776. 
But as the act and compact of the people themselves, it would 
still remain, and the government exist under it, until changed, 
either by a revolution, or peaceably and legally, in such a way 
that it might be presumed to be done with the consent of all, of 
which we shall speak hereafter. 

This charter only prescribed the boundaries of the colony, 
and the form and manner of election of the General Assembly, 
or legislature. All other matters were left to be provided for by 
the General Assembly. With the law, and practice settling the 
construction of it, and the usages which have grown up under 
it, it now forms the present constitution of the State of Rhode 
Island and Providence Plantations. 

We have heard a great deal from declaim ers about the omnip- 
otence of the General Assembly, and it has frequently been 
asserted, that they have always treated the charter as a mere 
thing of straw, and without consulting the peojrie, have altered 
it to suit their own pleasure. An examination of the cases will 
show, that all the instances, usually quoted to prove this, are 
instances where the General Assembly have interfered, either to 
settle a doubtful construction, or to provide for cases for which 
the charter had made no provision; but never to contradict its 
express declarations. 

As, by the charter, the governor or deputy-governor and six 
assistants, (or senators,) had it in their power to prevent the 
passage of any law, and thus had a practical negative on all pro- 
ceedings, an act was passed in May, 1696, providing that they 
should sit in a separate room and constitute a separate branch of 
the legislature. This was presumed to be in conformity with 
the spirit of the charter itself. It was adopted upon the request 



of the deputies themselves. It had been considered and debated 
at several sessions about twenty years before, and the people had 
now become convinced of its propriety. In Connecticut, whose 
charter was like that of Rhode Island, in this respect, a similar 
act was passed in October, 1698, dividing their General Assem- 
bly into two branches. 

By the charter, the voting for general officers was to be at 
Newport, "or elsewhere, if urgent occasion do require." The 
General Assembly afterwards authorized the people to vote at 
Newport, by proxy. 

There are also a number of cases where the Assembly have 
passed laws to provide for the contingencies of a failure of elec- 
tion, death, resignation, or removal, and as to whether a majority 
or plurality should elect. In all these cases, it will be perceived, 
there was either no provision made in the charter, or there was 
doubt about its construction. The party against whom any such 
case was settled, would, of course, consider it unconstitutional. 

The truth is, that the charter always has been substantially 
adhered to. The number of assistants or senators, the number 
and apportionment of deputies or representatives, the manner of 
the election, the whole form of the government is as of old. 
But as to the law-making power, the charter contained no limi- 
tations on the General Assembly. On the contrary, it expressly 
gave them all power. Our ancestors were a practical people. 
They inserted in the charter a provision requiring their deputies 
to be elected semi-annually. They thought this would be suf- 
ficient to prevent the legislature ever becoming the masters of 
the people. And time has proved their wisdom. 

In June, 1732-3, the Assembly passed "an act for choosing 
the deputies of the several towns in this colony annually " with 
an express proviso that the act should not take effect until after 
another election. But so determined were the people that the 
charter should not be infringed upon, and of so much import- 
ance did they consider this semi-annual election, that they sent 
men to the next Assembly who repealed it in December, 1733. 
And in September, 1789, the General Assembly, by resolution, 
declared, that, of themselves, they had no power to alter the 
constitution of the State. 

The government of Rhode Island, it is believed, has been prac- 



8 

tically, and in spirit if not in form, one of the most democratic 
in the Union. There has been no State in which changes in 
popular sentiment have made themselves sooner felt, owing to 
the frequency of elections. This has been the case' to a fault. 
There is no State in which the rights of the poor have been so 
carefully guarded by securing to every one a cheap administra- 
tion of justice. For it is no use to give a man rights, and then, 
(as is done in some of the most ultra-democratic States,) make 
the law process so intricate and expensive that he cannot obtain 
them. Our government has always been economical, because the 
representatives felt their responsibility to the people, and the 
voters were the tax payers. The Senate, elected by general 
ticket, always expresses the views of the political majority. 
Without knowing much about Pope, the people have acted on 
his principle, as to government, that 

" That which is best administered is best." 

Instead of looking at the form of government as the end, and 
making that their ultimate aim, which is a common error in 
modern times, they have regarded good government as the end 
to be aimed at, and the form as essential only so far as it is more 
or less adapted to produce that result.* 

*In the course of these remarks, I shall introduce several quotations 
from an able writer, Rev. O. A. Brownson, who has been much misunder- 
stood and misrepresented, because very little read by those who have 
abused him. Those who will take the pains to examine the whole of what 
he has written upon the subject of government, and will take it together, 
and not by piece-meal, will not find much to condemn. And while his 
democracy will not be impeached, he will be found to be no demagogue, or 
flatterer of the sovereign people. 

"The ends of government are determined by the law of eternal and 
absolute justice, and are every where and always the same. Always and 
every where it is obligatory on government to maintain justice between 
man and man, and to direct the activity of society to the common good of 
all its members. . . . But the form of the government is a mere question 
of means to an end. One form of government, in itself, is no more just 
and equitable than another, and no more obligatory upon a people. 

Hitherto, all governments have failed to realize, in any tolerable degree, 
the twofold end of government designated. The American governments 
form no exception to this statement. They have merely demonstrated that 
the American people can maintain a strong and stable government without 
kings or nobles; nothing more. It remains to be demonstrated that they 
can establish and maintain wise and just governments, which fulfil their 
duty alike to society aud the individual." — Boston Quarterly Review, 
vol. v. p. 29. 







The fact that the present government of Rhode Island is 
founded on a royal charter, has been seized upon by the abettors 
of the revolutionary movement, both here and abroad, and for 
want of something better, has been made an argument in their 
favor. A royal charter! and granted, too, by king Charles, not 
the very best of men!! In an appeal to popular prejudice, this 
might be used with great effect, and it has been done. 

But as our ancestors of the first settlement were practical 
men, so also were those of the Revolution. When they threw 
off the reality of their dependence upon Great Britain, they did 
not waste time upon mere names. As in Virginia, a man does 
not think himself any less a republican because he lives in King 
George or Prince William counties; and as in Connecticut, be- 
fore 1818, they were republicans and still lived under a royal 
charter, so in Rhode Island, they were content with enjoying a 
degree of actual liberty as great as in any country of the world, 
and instead of attempting to frame a government perfect in 
theory, they looked only to its practical effect upon their rights 
and happiness.* They did not hold to the idea that republican- 
ism consisted in the constant use of certain popular words and 
set phrases, and that every thing was right because they, the 
sovereign people, did it. They appealed to a higher power to 
justify their motives and conduct in that eventful struggle. 

It is a very common error abroad, to suppose that the charter 
defines the right of suffrage. The charter gave the colony 
power to admit as members of the political society all such per- 
sons as they should think fit. But the qualifications necessary 
for admission have always been prescribed by statute. 



* "This charter of government, constituting, as it then seemed, a pure 
democracy, and establishing a political system which few besides the 
Rhode Islanders themselves believed to be practicable, is still in existence, 
and is the oldest constitutional charter now valid in the world. It has 
outlived the principles of Clarendon, and the policy of Charles II. The 
probable population of Rhode Island at the time of its reception, may 
have been two thousand five hundred. In one hundred and seventy years, 
that number has increased forty fold; and the government which was 
hardly thought to contain checks enough on the power of the people to 
endure even among shepherds and farmers, protects a dense population, 
and the accumulations of a widely-extended commerce. Nowhere in the 
world have life, liberty, and property, been safer than in Rhode Island. " — 
Bancroft's History, vol. ii. p. 64. 
2 



10 



In the recent controversy, the name of freemen, as applied to 
the voters in Ehode Island, has been a frequent theme for decla- 
mation by demagogues. The people are told that all those who 
are not freemen are slaves. But the charter used a word, the 
meaning of which was well settled in English law, and was ap- 
plied to those who were admitted members of any corporation. 
And the word has continued in use ever since in Rhode Island, 
to signify the same as "electors," or qualified voters. 

A property qualification has always been required under the 
present government of Rhode Island. By the act of March 
1663-4, all persons were required to be of " competent estates," 
in order to be admitted to vote. There was, at that time, no 
need of specifying real estate, because what little personal estate 
was then in the colony was in the hands of those who also owned 
real estate. There was no need of specifying the amount, be- 
cause property had not then been much subdivided. The 
great object was to secure the control of affairs to those who had 
a permanent interest in the prosperity of the colony. This qual- 
ification of " competent estates," was reenacted in 1665. 

In February. 1723-4, we find the first law limiting any amount. 
By an act of that session, the voter was required to possess real 
estate valued at £100, or that would rent for forty shillings per 
annum, or to be the eldest son of such a voter. The eldest son 
was admitted, because, by the English laws, and the laws then 
in force here, the eldest son inherited the whole real estate of an 
intestate parent. 

February 1729-30, the qualification was fixed at £200 of real 
estate, or £10 per annum. August, 174G, it was made £400 of 
real estate, or £20 per annum. August, 1760, £40 of lawful 
money, or forty shillings per anuum. The digest of 1767 con- 
tains the same. In 1798, it was fixed at $134, or seven dollars 
per annum. 

One objection that has been made to our present system is, 
that the qualification is in the power of the General Assembly; 
that they can change it at pleasure for political purposes, and 
that they have done so in times past. 

But on examining the facts, the reader who has heard only 
the common version of the story will be surprised to find, that 
there never has been any substantial change in the amount of 



11 



property required, and that ever since the amount was fixed in 
1723-4, it has been considered as a fundamental law, not to be 
touched on slight occasions. Party violence has never dared to 
undertake to make this law bend to party purposes, any more 
than if it had been a part of the charter itself. It was safer in 
the attachment of the people to the principle, than with all the 
forms and ceremonies that could have been gathered around it. 

All these seeming inconsistencies are easily explained by recur- 
ring to the history of the emissions of paper money made by the 
colonies. The qualifications of 1723-4, 1729-30, and 1746, are 
in old tenor, so called, the value of which was constantly depre- 
ciating. The qualification of 1760 is in lawful money, and in 
1798 was merely changed into dollars, at six shillings to a dollar. 

A great deal of ridicule has been cast upon the freehold quali- 
fication, and with the ignorant has probably passed for argu- 
ment. It has been called the sand and gravel qualification, and 
it has been triumphantly asked, what virtue there is in a little 
" dirt," to qualify a man for voting. And again it is said, that 
if property is to qualify, the more property a man has, the more 
votes he should be entitled to. Those who can use such argu- 
ments must be dupes themselves, or must think their followers 
can be easily duped. 

Our ancestors, it is to be presumed, did not intend to give the 
vote to the property, but to the man. The line must be drawn 
somewhere. The possession of real estate was supposed, in most 
cases, to be some evidence of intelligence, industry, and economy, 
necessary to acquire or preserve it. It was also supposed to fur- 
nish the best possible evidence of attachment to the State and 
its institutions, and an intention to make their permanent resi- 
dence and home here. It was fixed so low, that every person of 
ordinary industry could easily obtain the amount. It was not 
exclusive or confined to a class, because every person who chose 
might bring himself within the rule. 

That these were the reasons which governed our ancestors, is 
apparent from the whole course of their history, and 1 the Rhode 
Island Convention of 1790, on adopting the Constitution of the 
United States, expressly declare that, " all men having sufficient 
evidence of permanent common interest with and attachment to 



12 



the community, ought to have the right of suffrage." The laws 
plainly show what they thought this sufficient evidence to be. 

In connection with the present qualification, it may be well to 
refer to one charge which has often been brought against the 
present laws, and that is, that none but a freeholder can prose- 
cute in the courts without obtaining a freeholder to be surety 
for him. This is sufficiently answered by stating the fact and 
the object of it. In all petty criminal cases, triable by justices, 
the complainant is required to give security to pay the cost if he 
does not succeed. In all prosecutions for larger offences, no 
security whatever is required. In all civil cases, the prosecutor 
is required to be a freeholder or to have his writ endorsed by a 
sufficient freeholder. This is done as much for the protection of 
the poor as the rich, to prevent one man suing another upon 
some frivolous pretence, and putting him to trouble and expense, 
and then leaving him to pay his own cost. It has the good 
effect of discouraging litigation, and, at the same time, it is be- 
lieved that not a single instance can be produced, where any 
practical injustice has resulted from it. No one, native or for- 
eigner, really injured, ever yet lacked a friend for a surety, for 
the costs in Rhode Island courts are very low. 

The first question which would present itself to the inquirer 
considering our recent difficulties, would be — the propriety or 
expediency of a change. 

It is too much the fashion at the present day, and in our 
country, to condemn all forms of government which do not 
square with our own notions of theoretical right, without con- 
sidering the character of a people or their local circumstances. 
A suffrage limited only by age and short residence, is liable to 
objections in Rhode Island not applicable to any other State. 
The great disproportion between the city and the country, and 
the preponderance of the manufacturing over the agricultural 
interest, would strike the most careless observer. The fact that 
the government has been in the hands of the holders of prop- 
erty, has had the effect of making it the most economical one 
in the Union. "K 

While there have been many disadvantages, it must be allowed 
there have been also many advantages in our being without any 
written constitution, except the charter which prescribes nothing 



13 

but the form and manner of election of the legislature. We 
have thus (except a few instances) been saved those endless quib- 
bles about construction to which the best-drawn written instru- 
ments are liable, and which occupy so much of the time of 
congress and our State legislatures. Ours had a pliability of 
which a written instrument is incapable, by which it was easily 
adapted to any change of circumstances, while the two branches 
of the legislature being elected by different constituencies, and 
the tax payers holding the power in the last resort, were suffic- 
ient checks against any too sudden innovation. And the proba- 
bility is, that if a change had been made in the representation 
seasonably, so as to correspond with the change in the popula- 
tion of different towns, no other important alteration would 
have been made in a long time. Inequality of representation 
was complained of long before extension of suffrage had many 
friends. That the limitation of suffrage is an oppression suf- 
ficient to justify a revolution by force, is a modern discovery. 

But we do not propose to discuss these questions, because the 
landholders of Rhode Island, with a due regard to the change 
which has taken place in the population and condition of the 
State, have given up the question of expediency, and consented 
to make the alteration required. But they wish to make the 
change legally, and still to require some evidence of intelligence, 
honesty, and attachment to the State, before a person is allowed 
to vote. 

^ That property, although, generally, some evidence of intelli- 
gence, is not the best or the only evidence, we readily admit. 
In the words of one we have before quoted, — "The number 
properly qualified in any community, for the exercise of political 
power, is unquestionably small. The voice of the multitude is 
rarely the voice of God. But the few who are qualified, are as 
likely to be found among those whom [the advocates for the 
property qualification] would exclude from the elective franchise, 
as among those to whom they would extend it. The ignorant 
multitude are as likely to be on one side of the line as on the 
other; and vice is as prevalent among the rich as among the 
poor, and altogether more dangerous."* x 

* Boston Quarterly Review, vol. v. p. 30. 



14 

j 
s A qualification, depending upon taxation or military service, 

is liable to two serious objections: first, the danger of fraud, 
putting it in the power of party assessors and military officers, 
to make and unmake voters, together with the temptation to 
perjury; second, that a new agitation may be immediately com- 
menced to obtain a further extension of suffrage, and thus the 
community be kept in constant excitement. 

The Freemen's Convention, therefore, which formed the con- 
stitution lately rejected, wisely concluded, that when they once 
gave up the landed qualification, they would not stop half way. 
They required two years residence, only, for native American 
citizens. And this constitution received the hearty support of 
the great body of those same landholders, who have been accused 
of being so tyrannical and oppressive. 

The question of expediency being thus waived, and the free- 
holders having agreed to the necessity of a change, it remains to 
consider the manner in which the change is to be made; and 
this brings us to investigate the recent attempts to effect a forci- 
ble revolution, and the reasons which have been urged in its jus- 
tification. 

After the Revolution, several attempts were made to have a 
convention called for the purpose of equalizing the representa- 
tion, but they had no reference to any extension of suffrage. In 
April, 1782, a meeting of delegates from the several towns in 
Washington county, recommended to the General Assembly to 
call a convention for this purpose. In 1786, a bill was intro- 
duced in the House, providing that each town should have two 
representatives, and no more. This was referred to the people, 
and subsequently rejected. In 1796, a meeting at Providence, 
of delegates from eight towns in the counties of Providence and 
Bristol, recommended a constitution. At the June session of 
the Assembly, 1799, John Smith, of Providence, moved in the 
House of Representatives, to have a convention 'called to frame 
a constitution, and that there should be one delegate for every 
thousand inhabitants in a town. Mr. Champlin, of Newport, 
seconded the motion, and it prevailed by a vote of forty-four out 
of seventy. It was probably lost in the Senate.* 

*For several of these memoranda, the writer is indebted to the Hon. 
William R. Staples. 



15 



In the year 1811, a bill was passed by the Senate, extending 
suffrage, in some degree, but never became a law. This is be- 
lieved to have been altogether a political movement. In the year 
1824, a constitution formed by a convention called by the legis- 
lature, remedyiug, in a great degree, the inequality in the repre- 
sentation, but retaining the old suffrage qualification, was rejected 
by the people. In 1834, a convention, called by the legislature 
for the same purpose, dissolved without doing any thing. 

About this time, the whigs being out of power, some of them 
took up the subject of a constitution, and uniting with the 
friends of extension of suffrage, formed and supported a ticket 
of State officers, but not getting many votes, and finding it was 
then rather unpopular, it was dropped. 

But a new elemeut was now at work in preparing the way for 
revolution. The then government of the United States was un- 
popular with a portion of the people, and the discontented, 
being unsuccessful in their attempts to change their rulers in a 
peaceable, legal, and constitutional way, were loud in their 
threats of forcible resistance and even of assassination. This 
spirit was not confined to the poor or ignorant, but was common, 
and encouraged among those who claimed to be the most intelli- 
gent and patriotic of the community. And, finally, in the grand 
hard cider powow of 1840, instead of appealing to the under- 
standing and sober reason of the people, the appeal was openly 
made to the passions and senses alone, and music and songs, 
processions, banners, and the machinery of stump and mass 
meetings, which, although common at the West, had not before 
got into fashion in sober New England, were made the ordinary 
means of electioneering, against the then national administration. 

"They have sown the wind, and they shall reap the whirl- 
wind." 

In January, 1841, the legislature passed resolutions calling 
another convention to meet in November, the delegates to be 
elected in August, by the present freemen. This was done, 
partly in consequence of petitions for extension of suffrage, and 
partly in consequence of the memorial from the town of Smith- 
field, which had, for several years, been endeavoring to obtain 
an increase of its representation. 

At the spring elections of 1840 and 1841, the whigs elected 



16 



the entire Senate, and a majority of the representatives. The 
democrats were now out of power, and following the example 
which had been set them, a portion of them took up the subject 
of the extension of suffrage; but the public mind had become 
so excited by the late severe political struggles, that it could 
hardly be expected but that some excesses should be committed 
in its support. 

The new agitators, recollecting the means by which the suc- 
cessful party had gained the last presidential campaign, concluded 
to make use of the same machinery "of music and processions. 
In consequence of the recent temperance reform, they were 
obliged to make one omission. But they procured their music 
and banners, published a song-book, and on the 17th of April, 
1841, commenced more active operations by roasting an ox, a 
calf, and a hog, whole, upon Jefferson plains. 

The enterprise was well planned for success. The democrats, 
it was supposed, would join, because some of the leaders were 
democrats; and it was thought that the whigs had become so 
used to following music, flags, and processions, that they would 
fall in and join in the hurrah, as a matter of course, and with- 
out asking any questions. 

On May 5, 1841, being the day of the inauguration of the 
newly-elected government and the meeting of the legislature, 
which always brings together a great concourse of people at 
Newport, the suffrage party held a mass meeting at that place, 
and appointed a State committee with directions " to call a con- 
vention of delegates to draft a constitution at as early a day as 
possible," independent of, and without consulting the Assembly, 
any further than to order their proceedings to be transmitted to 
them. This mass meeting was adjourned to meet on July 5, 
(4th being Sunday,) at Providence. 

At the May session, of the legislature, they passed an act rem- 
edying the inequality of representation of the towns in the com- 
ing convention, and fixing the number of delegates. 

At the same session, a motion was made by a member, to 
extend the right of voting for delegates to the proposed conven- 
tion. He said he had been requested to propose it in order to 
meet the views of a considerable portion of the people. The 
subject was then postponed to the June session, when the motion 



17 



was rejected. But at neither session was any petition presented 
or any evidence whatever, offered, that any sufficiently large por- 
tion of the people demanded any change in the suffrage. 

At the adjourned mass meeting of the suffrage party, July 5, 
at Providence, the instructions before given were reaffirmed, 
and, July 20, the committee met, and issued a call to the people 
to elect delegates, on August 28, to attend a convention to be 
held at Providence, on the 1st Monday (4th) of October. The 
committee authorized all male American citizens, (natives and 
foreigners, and without distinction of color,) aged twenty-one 
years* and who had resided in the State one year, to vote for 
delegates; and they fixed the number of delegates at one to a 
thousand, each town to have, at least, one, and Providence to 
elect three for each of its six wards. 

It has frequently been asserted in defence of the suffrage 
party,* that they did not take any active measures to call a con- 
vention until after the June session, when all hope of obtaining 
anything from the Assembly, was gone. The foregoing facts 
prove the contrary. The resolutions of May 5, were in some 
respects cautiously worded, as the party were not then sufficiently 
prepared for strong measures, and it was the policy of the lead- 
ers to draw them along gradually. But they, at that meeting, 
expressly directed their committee to call a convention, and that 
committee on June 11, drew up and adopted a long address to 
the people, which address was published in the New Age of the 
18th, and in which they boldly avow that they have no longer 
any hope of obtaining their object by the ballot box, and declare 
their intention to adopt the measures they have since adopted, 
and expressly say that, "in due time, the committee to whom 
that duty has been entrusted, will issue the call for primary 
meetings, preliminary to the call of the State Convention." All 
this was some days before the June session of the Assembly, 
(June 22d) at which the motion for extension was to be consid- 

*Dr. Brown's statement to the president; and also, see comment of the 
Suffrage State Committee on the statement submitted to the president by 
Messrs. Whipple, Francis and Potter. Mr. Dorr, however, in his message 
to his legislature makes no such claim. It certainly cannot be said that the 
suffrage party continued their exertions to produce a peaceable change for 
any great length of time before resorting to revolution, for the Providence 
Suffrage Association was not formed until March, 1840. 
3 



18 



ered. The threatening language used in the resolutions and 
address were not calculated to influence the General Assembly 
much in their favor, and were probably actually intended to have 
the contrary effect. The language used towards the General 
Assembly, in the newspaper organ of the party, had, for a long 
time, been very violent. 

Delegates were elected to both of the conventions, and they 
both met at the time appointed. No opposition at all was made 
to these proceedings in their early stages, because it was consid- 
ered by all, except the few who were in the secrets of the party, 
to be a mere political game designed to divide and distract the 
whig party, then in power. The People's Convention, so called, 
met in October, and adjourned to November, after preparing 
and publishing a draft of a constitution providing the same ex- 
tension of suffrage as in the constitution they afterwards adopted. 

This instance is enough, if there were no other, to show how 
much there is in a name. A few persons get together, and call 
themselves the people. And then they ask, are not the people 
sovereign? Have they not the right to do whatever they choose? 
It was certainly a lucky thought. Even according to their own 
statement, not more than 7000 persons, freeholders and non- 
freeholders, took any part in electing their delegates; and to 
make up this number, it has been said that spectators and people 
of all sorts were included. 

The Landholders', or legal Convention met in November, pre- 
pared and published a draft of a constitution in which the right 
of suffrage was extended to personal property, and adjourned to 
February for the express purpose, as they declared, of obtaining 
the opinion of their constituents as to the expediency of a fur- 
ther extension. 

The People's Convention met in November, the week after the 
other had adjourned and completed their constitution. The 
right of suffrage was extended to all white male American citi- 
zens, who were of twenty-one years of age, and had resided in 
the State one year. 

This constitution was afterwards found to be very far from 
perfect. Mr. Dorr himself was fully capable of the task, but in 
amending and altering his plans, it was impossible but that some 
blunders should be made. A rather amusing instance of this 



19 



occurred when their legislature afterwards assembled. When 
the two houses wished to join in convention, it was found that 
there was no provision as to who should preside. But as they 
were all of one party, the matter was easily arranged. 

By order of the convention this constitution was submitted 
" to the people," on December 27th, 28th, and 29th, in open 
meetings held on those three days, and every person who, "from 
sickness or other causes," did not vote on those three days, was 
authorized to send his vote in to the moderator, within three 
days thereafter. 

In voting for or against the constitution, the voters were re- 
quired to be American citizens, aged twenty-one, and having 
their permanent residence or home in the State, but without any 
limitation of sex, color, place of nativity, or any fixed period of 
residence whatever. The voters were required to say whether 
they were qualified by the existing laws or not. 

The means adopted were almost certain to ensure the desired 
result. The votes were to be returned to, and be counted by the 
convention, who thus kept the whole matter under their own 
control. But they reserved the question of how many were nec- 
essary to make a majority of those whom they called the people, 
until their next meeting, when they would know how many votes 
they had actually obtained, and of what sorts. If they obtained 
a majority of all the males over twenty-one by the census, it 
would be well. If they did not come up to this, they could 
make a deduction for paupers, idiots, transient persons, &c. 
If they obtained a majority of the legal voters, or freemen, they 
would feel somewhat stronger. By means of the railroad and 
expresses the votes from all parts of the State could be reported 
at Providence every day during the canvass, and measures taken 
accordingly. 

During the first three days, about 9000 votes were obtained 
from all sources. During the remaining three days, by the priv- 
ilege given them of going about to people's houses and getting 
their votes, about 5000 more were brought in, making in all 
about 14,000. The convention met in January, 1842, counted 
the votes, declared them to be a majority, and their constitution 
to be adopted. The fact of this majority, and the motives of 
those who voted, we shall hereafter consider. 



20 



The question now began to be a serious one. The suffrage 
party felt strong from the recent vote. At the January session, 
1842, the Assembly passed resolutions declaring these proceed- 
ings illegal and revolutionary, and, at the same time, in order 
to do every thing in their power to appease the growing excite- 
ment, they passed an act, declaring that all persons who should 
be admitted to vote under the provisions of the constitution to 
be made by the legal convention in February, should be admitted 
to vote for or against its adoption. 

The legal convention met again in February. After the recent 
expression of public opinion, there could no longer be any hesi- 
tation, and accordingly, they finished their constitution, and 
admitted every white male native American citizen to vote who 
had resided in the State two years, and was twenty-one years of 
age, without property, taxation, or military service. Foreigners 
were required to possess a small freehold. On the 21st, 22d, and 
23d of March, this constitution was voted for. The votes were — 
for, 8013; against, 868'.); total, 16,702. Majority against it, 676. 

The people's party exerted themselves with the utmost zeal to 
defeat it. Many voted against it because they were attached -to 
the old charter, and some because they were misled by the 
numerous misrepresentations concerning it. 

At a session of the Assembly in March, 1842, they passed an 
act declaring that the holding any office under the people's con- 
stitution should be considered treason. The punishment of 
treason, by a previous statute, was imprisonment for life. This 
act is called by the suffrage party the " Algerine Law." A com- 
mittee also made a full report justifying the proceedings of the 
Assembly in relation to the extension of suffrage. 

The governor afterwards appointed Messrs. John Whipple, 
John Brown Francis, and Elisha K. Potter to proceed to Wash- 
ington, and lay the case before the president. His reply will be 
given in the appendix. 

The subsequent movements are generally well known. In 
May, 1842, the old government was organized as usual, and a 
ticket composed of both political parties elected. The people's 
party also elected a governor (Mr. Dorr) and a legislature. Mr. 
Dorr, in May, made an unsuccessful attempt to take possession 
of the arsenal by military force, and in June, he assembled a 



21 

force to protect the meeting of his legislature at Chepachet, and 
probably for further measures. Both of these attempts he was 
obliged to abandon by a superior military force. 

Mr. Dorr was evidently led to make these movements by the 
belief that all those who had voted for the people's constitution, 
had been in earnest, and intended to support it. There had, 
from the beginning, been frequent meetings of the party in all 
parts of the State, at which resolutions of the most violent char- 
acter had been passed, pledging their lives, their fortunes, and 
their sacred honor, to defend their cause. Mr. Dorr undoubt- 
edly thought that all this was sincere, and that it meant what it 
pretended to be, instead of being, as the event showed it was, 
mere common party verbiage. There was a considerable num- 
ber of persons in military array, who would probably have 
assisted him in case any attempt had been made to arrest him. 
He was mistaken, however, in supposing that they were prepared 
to follow him in taking possession of the public property, or 
attacking the established government. 

In June, 1842, the General Assembly determined to make an- 
other attempt to appease the excitement, and satisfy the suffrage 
party. They passed an act calling a convention to meet in Sep- 
tember. The ^delegates Avere to be elected in August, and three 
years' residence was required, without property, taxation, or mil- 
itary service, to qualify persons to vote for delegates. And in 
order to make the representation in the convention more nearly 
proportioned to population than it was in the Assembly, they 
fixed upon a scale which gave Newport four delegates, and Prov- 
idence six, thus inverting the present ratio. It is hoped the 
result of this convention may be to give peace to the State.* 

It has been objected to the new convention act, that the 
apportionment of the delegates is unequal. But it should be 
recollected that it is an attempt at a compromise, and it certainly 
cannot but be considered as a very liberal advance towards recon- 
ciliation on the part of the existing government. 

The issue now is between the old and established government, 

*It has been asserted, that the General Assembly did not pass this act 
until they were driven to it by the news of the gathering at Chepachet. It 
should be stated, that the terms of the bill had been agreed upon at an in- 
formal meeting of the members, the bill had been introduced and printed, 
and had actually passed the Senate, before the news arrived at Newport. 



22 



and any constitution which may be made under their authority 
on the one part, and the people's constitution, under which Gov- 
ernor Dorr acts, on the other. 

We come now to consider the reasons put forth to justify the 
recent attempt at revolution; and these resolve themselves into 
questions of principle and questions of fact, — whether the ma- 
jority of the people have the right assumed, and whether a ma- 
jority was ever actually obtained. 

The first question is, whether a majority of the whole people, 
without reference to any existing laws regulating the right of 
voting, have a right to change the government at any time and 
in any manner they choose: for this is the position taken. 

In whatever may be said upon this subject, we do not wish to 
be understood as denying what may be called the right of revo- 
lution, or the right of any portion of the people who are 
oppressed to redress their grievances by force, after having tried 
all peaceable means without effect. But this is a right which 
belongs not to majorities only, but to any number of citizens, 
however small, who are oppressed, where the oppression is suffi- 
cient to justify it, and there is no mode of redressing it but by a 
revolution. For engaging in such a cause every man has to 
account with his own conscience and his God. If the change 
now attempted had been called a revolution, it would have been 
rightly named, and then no one would have been deceived by it. 
But the ground taken is, that the majority can legally and con- 
stitutionally change the government at any time and iu any 
manner; or, in other words, that their supremacy in all things 
is a fundamental principle of republican law. It has been some- 
times called, strangely enough, the doctrine of peaceable revolu- 
tion. By believing it to be rightful and legal, and that it would 
be peaceable, hundreds have been misled who would never have 
countenanced it if called by its right name.* 

* "I have heard much of late about the right of revolution, and there 
is no doubt but that, in those cases where a people, by the oppression and 
violence of their rulers, are thrown upon the natural right of self-preser- 
vation, this right exists, may be exercised, and a revolution be justified; 
but however justifiable it may be, we should always recollect, that, if it be 
revolution, it is revolution, and nothing but revolution. There is no possi- 
bility of making it half revolution, and balf not. If you resort to revolu- 
tion, 3 r ou must adopt it with all its consequences, be they never so calamit- 



23 

It is very plain, that if they can disregard the laws established 
by society in one instance, they can in any other. If they have 
a right to depart from the law which regulates the qualification 
of voters, they have an equal right to depart from the laws 
which regulate boundary lines. They are all alike results of the 
institution of society, and without society they would have no 
existence. The boundary line between Connecticut and Rhode 
Island is merely an artificial line established by a treaty or law. 
What, upon the doctrine in question, is to prevent a portion of 
the people of Connecticut from joining with a portion of the 
people of Rhode Island and forming a new State? If you an- 
swer that this boundary line was a compact between two societies, 
established by our ancestors, and, therefore, binding on us, you 
grant all I ask. But what is to prevent the majority of the peo- 
ple of Washington county setting up for themselves? Why 
should not the people of Long Island separate from New York? 
The majority of the people of the northern part of Illinois 
would perhaps like to join Wisconsin, and thus get out of debt. 
What is there to prevent continual changes of this sort, upon 
the doctrine in question? You will answer, the Constitution of 
the United States would prevent the erection of new States or 
alteration of old ones, without consent of congress. But if the 
majority of the people of Rhode Island have a right to change 
their own government in this manner, they have an equal right 
to throw off the government of the Union; for they both stand 
upon the same foundation, a compact made by our forefathers. 
And again; upon the new doctrines, the Constitution of the 
United States was never legally adopted, and is not binding, for 
a majority of the whole people never assented to it, and in almost 

ous. These calculations are to be made at the commencement of it, and 
weighed against the evils which it is proposed to remedy. . . . 

Strong heads and patriotic hearts, doubtless, gave the first impulse to the 
French revolution; but does not the progress and issue of that bloody dra- 
ma tell us that those abstractions, (in which they so freely dealt,) whatever 
might be their theoretic truth, became false and fiendish in their application? 
Do we not know that the very masses which were engaged in carrying them 
out, rejoiced when the iron rule of military despotism came, to deliver them 
from themselves, and from the incarnate demons which the movement had 
conjured up. 

When all men are angels, and of the same order, these abstractions may 
be true in all their consequences, but never in their application to man as 
he is." — Chief Justice Durfee's Charge. 



24 



all the States at the time of its adoption, there were great restric- 
tions upon suffrage. Further, what is to prevent a majority 
of the whole people of the Union, without regard to the lines 
of States, from changing the Constitution of the Union, and 
making us one consolidated nation? If the majority, without 
reference to laws, have this right in Rhode Island, the majority 
of the United States have it also, and so on; for boundary lines 
are but laws, the artificial institutions or results of society. 
These, it may be said, are all idle fears, but they are submitted 
as the legitimate consequences of the reasoning of the revolu- 
tionists, if carried to their full length in practice. 

The more we consider these things, the more reason we shall 
see in the old-fashioned doctrine, that a change of government 
can only take place in one of two ways, — legally, with the con- 
sent of the existing government, or by a revolution, brought 
about by force, or the fear of force. They may actually prevail 
in conflict, or they may exhibit such strength as to awe the 
minority into submission without conflict. In either case, it 
would be a revolution, and not a legal change. The doctrine 
of peaceable legal revolution was a discovery reserved for this 
enlightened age and people. 

We are either an organized society, or Ave are not. If we are 
not, then we should be in a state of nature, and a majority could 
have no right to bind us, for in that state no one man would 
have a right to govern another. If we are members of an or- 
ganized political society, then we are as much bound by one of 
its laws as another, until they are legally changed, or until the 
oppression is so great that the duty of self-preservation compels 
them to appeal from the laws of society to the laws of humanity. 
To hold the contrary, is to give to a majority the power to turn 
might into right, and to confound moral distinctions.* 

* "Democracy, in the sense we are now considering it, is sometimes asserted to be the 
sovereignty of the people. If this be a true account of it, it is indefensible. The sover- 
eignty of the people is not a truth. Sovereignty is that which is highest, ultimate; which 
has not only the physical force to make itself obeyed, but the moral right to command 
whatever it pleases. . . . 

"Are the people the highest? Are they ultimate? And are we bound in conscience to 
obey whatever it may be their good pleasure to ordain? If so, where is individual liberty? 
If so, the people, taken collectively, are the absolute master of every man taken individ- 
ually. Every man, as a man. then, is an absolute slave. Whatever the people, in their 
collective capacity, may demand of him, he must feel himself bound in conscience lo give. 
No matter how intolerable the burdens imposed, painful and needless the sacrifices re- 
quired, he cannot refuse obedience, without incurring the guilt of disloyalty; and he must 
submit in silence, without even the moral right to feel that he is wronged. 



25 



If we are not an organized society, if the State does not con- 
stitute a quasi corporation, how can we bind ourselves by a treaty, 
how can we incur a debt for posterity to pay? It has, heretofore, 
been thought reasonable, that as a new generation takes posses- 
sion of a country, with all the advantages derived from the labors 
and accumulations of their ancestors, they should also take upon 
themselves their burdens. But if a bare majority have a right 

"Now this, in theory at least, is absolutism. Whether it be a democracy, or any other 
form of government, if it be absolute, there is, and there can be, no individual liberty. . . . 

" But this is not the end of the chapter. Under a democratic form of government, all 
questions which come up for the decision of authority, must be decided by a majority of 
voices. The sovereignty which is asserted for the people, must then be transferred to the 
ruling majority. If the people are sovereign, then the majority are sovereign; and if sov- 
ereign the majority have, as Miss Martineau lays it down, the absolute right to govern. If 
the majority have the absolute right to govern, it is the absolute duty of the minority to 
obey We hold our property, our wives and children, and our lives even at its sov- 
ereign will and pleasure. It may do by us and ours as it pleases. If it take it into its 
head to make a new and arbitrary division of property, however unjust it may seem, we 
shall not only be impotent to resist, but we shall not even have the right of the wretched 

to complain The creed the majority is pleased to impose, the minority must, in 

all meekness and submission, receive Whatever has been done under the most ab- 
solute monarchy, or the most lawless aristocracy, may be re-enacted under a pure democ- 
racy, and, what is worse, legitimately, too, if it be once laid down in principle, that the 
majority has the absolute right to govern. 

" The majority will always have the physical power to coerce the minority into submis- 
sion; but this is a matter of no moment, in comparison with the doctrine which gives 
them the right to do it. We have very little fear of the physical force of numbers, when 
we can oppose to it the moral force of right. The doctrine in question deprives us of this 

moral force It is not the physical force of the majority that we dread, but the 

doctrine that legitimates each and every act the majority may choose to perform 

"The effects of this doctrine, so far as believed and acted on, cannot be too earnestly 
deprecated. It creates a multitude of demagogues pretending a world of love for the dear 
peovle, lauding the people's virtues, magnifying their sovereignty, and with mock humility 

professing their readiness ever to bow to the will of the majority It generates a 

habit of appealing; on all occasions, from truth and justice, wisdom and virtue, to the 
force of numbers, and virtually sinks the man into the brute." — Boston Quarterly Review, 
vol. i. pp. 37-40, 47. . 

Mr. Brownson then proceeds to explain what is all that can really be 
meant by the sovereignty of the people, and its limitations. 

"There is among us a strong tendency to sweep away every institution, every organic 
form whether in the executive, judicial, or legislative branches of the government, which 
may have heretofore interposed anobstacle to the free and full expression of the irrespon- 
sible will of the majority. Every amendment proposed or adopted of any of our civil 
constitutions, has a direct tendency to throw additional power into the hands of the party, 
which chances to be in the majority, and to remove some safeguard from the minority. 
The whole spirit of the American people, not of one party only, is to sweep away all bar- 
riers to the establishment of absolute democracy, which shall cause the government in its 
administration to feel and respond to every wave of public opinion or popular caprice. 
This is easily accounted for, and is by no means an unnatural tendency; but it is, perhaps, 
time to inquire, whither it is likely to lead, and whether it is likely to increase the security 
we demand for individual rights."— Ibid, vol. iv. p. 279. 

See Mr. Brownson's remarks on the folly of that portion of the democracy, 
who wished to change or abolish the Senate, merely because it for a while 
opposed some measures of their favorite, General Jackson. — vol. iv. p. 367. 

" We hold ourselves among the foremost of those who demand reform, and who would live 
and die for progress: but we wish no haste, no violence in pulling down old institutions, or 
in building up new ones. We would innovate boldly in our speculations, but, in action, we 
tvould cling to old usages, and keep by old tines of policy till we were fairly forced by the on- 
ward pressure of opinion to abandon them. We would think with the radical, but often 
act with the conservative. When the time comes to abandon an old practice, when new 
circumstauceshave arisen to demand a new line of policy, then, we say, let no attachments 
to the past make us blind to our duty, or impotent to perform it. All we say is. let nothing 
be done in a hurry, and let no rage for experiments be encouraged."— Ibid, vol. i. p. 73. 

4 



26 



to alter the government in any manner they please, and without 
reference to the qualifications required by the laws, if laws or 
compacts of government made by our forefathers are of no bind- 
ing force, then for the same reason, one generation could never 
bind another, in any respect, and treaties would be ties of straw, 
and debts go unpaid; old-fashioned notions of honesty would 
have to be laid aside. The connection between these doctrines 
is nearer than would be at first supposed. 

If, then, a majority can ride over or depart from the law in 
one instance, without resorting to the required forms of law for 
its repeal, there is the same reason for their right to do it in all. 
They may equally disregard boundary lines, laws making com- 
pacts or treaties, and laws for contracting debts. They may do 
all this by force, I admit, and then the justification will depend 
upon the nature of the case. What T object to is, its being 
called legal or right, merely because it is the will of the majority. 

But it is asserted (and this is at the bottom of the whole diffi- 
culty) that every man has a natural right to vote, to participate 
in the government, and more especially in the formation of a 
constitution. As ordinarily stated, this position is self-contra- 
dictory. In an ' ' address to the people of Rhode Island,"* in 
1834, this claim of natural right is stated in the ablest manner 
of which it is susceptible. The facts and arguments of the suf- 
frage party have never been more ably or candidly stated than 
in this address. It indeed contains the germs of all the princi- 
ples and arguments since advanced by Mr. Dorr, and by the party. 

Page 26, — "We contend, then, that a participation in the 
choice of those who make and administer laivs is a natural right, 
which cannot be abridged nor suspended any farther than the great- 
est good of the greatest number imperatively requires." (Itali- 
cised in original.) 

Strictly speaking, any thing cannot be a natural right, which, 
in a state of nature, would have no existence, and which is 
wholly and solely the result of the establishment of society, as 
government and the making of laws is. 

If the address means that the just object of government is to 
secure to every individual as great a degree of liberty, both of 

* The historical parts of this pamphlet, were contributed by Joseph K. Augell, Esq., the 
statistics by William H. Smith, and the remainder, including all the argumentative part, 
by Thomas Wilson Dorr, Esq. 



27 



thought and of action, as is consistent with the good of the 
whole, that is, of society, and that the greater the number of 
individuals who participate in the administration, the greater 
the security that the measures of the government will be for the 
good of the whole, instead of consulting only the welfare of the 
few, we presume its correctness would be generally admitted. 

It is very fashionable to talk about "the greatest good of the 
greatest number."* But, while the good of the many ought not 
to be sacrificed to the good of the few, on the other hand, the 
welfare of a minority ought not to be sacrificed even to the 
greatest good of the greatest number. This savors too much of 
submitting every thing to the will of the majority. All laws 
should be for the greatest good of the whole society. 

A practical difficulty then arises, who are to be excluded from 
political power, and who are to decide upon the exclusion. The 
writer of the address himself, is obliged to admit that this exclu- 
sion from, or abridgment of the right of suffrage is a question 
of expediency, and that, if the public good requires any one to 
be excluded, the exclusion is right. 

Address, pages 28-9,— "As a general rule, then, government 
was first formed by the act and with the consent of those who 
were to be governed, given either expressly or by acquiescence. 
And what did government confer upon those who established it? 
Here lies the radical error of those who contend that all political 
rights are the creatures of the political compact. Those reason- 
ers will tell you about rights created by society. We wish to ask 
previously, what those rights were which existed before political 
society itself. Those rights were the rights to life, to liberty, to 
property — in general, to the pursuit of happiness An- 
other great personal right already alluded to, has been reserved 
for the last; it is the right which every man among the families 
by which nations ivere composed, had, of giving or withholdhig 
his voice in every question relating to the union of those families 
in a form of government ; and of removing from its jurisdiction 
if that union id ere formed against his consent. The existence of 

such a natural right is too evident to be disputed This 

right is the very right of suffrage which is the burden of our 

* Judge Upshur's Address, p. 21. 



28 



present enquiry, and which we call a natural right. Political 
society could not confer that right or power upon its members by 
the exercise of which it first came into existence. In other words, 
man, in the exercise of his natural rights, made government, 
and government did not give to man his rights." (Italicised as 
in original.) 

This is a singular example of confusion of ideas, and of the 
inconsistencies to which a very able man is driven, in supporting 
such a case. He here confounds two. things which are entirely 
separate and distinct: first, the right which every man had, be- 
fore society was formed, to say, whether he would join it or not, 
and which, in fact, is the only natural right of suffrage; second, 
the right of participating in government after the society is 
formed, the right to vote, which right depends entirely upon 
laws which the society makes, with a view to the good of the 
whole. We will not argue as to whether society can, with pro- 
priety, be said to confer this second right. It is sufficient to say, 
that society entirely excludes some from it and gives it to others, 
and that, without society and the law, the right would have no 
existence. If society does not confer it, nature certainly does 
not.* 

The meaning of this paragraph of the address, however, would 
seem to be that the second right is a continuation of the exist- 
ence of the first; to which view the foregoing remarks also apply 
in answer. 

The distinction is easily illustrated by an instance of an ordi- 
nary agreement. The right of a man to enter into an agreement, 
is perfectly distinct from the rights which he has under and by 
virtue of the agreement when made. 

The address also contends, that society does not create any 
new rights; but only protects and regulates those which man 
would have in a state of nature; and gives, for an instance, the 

* " Natural and civil rights cannot be enjoyed at the same time. We must give up the 
one to attain the other." " This leads us to the correction of that opinion which has been 
maintained by so many philosophers, that men resign part of their natural rights, to ob- 
tain security for the remainder, by substituting for it the proposition, that men give up to 
the community a part of their natural rights to acquire civil rights. From this same prin- 
ciple it follows, that the opinion that society, in the administration of right, grants noth- 
ing to any of its members, is not well founded. For in the civil state, which is deemed 
the same as the social state, by the administration of the government, the members do 
acquire certain positive rights, which they can enjoy only in a civil state, and which are, 
therefore, to be considered as the gift and the offspring of social institutions."' — Judge 
Swift, vol. i. p. 16. 



29 



right of property. But the right of property cannot certainly 
be called a natural right. For, in the imaginary state of nature, 
a man could only hold any thing in two ways: first, by force, 
which it will not be contended could make a right; second, by 
consent, which very consent is the essence of, and constitutes 
society. The right to a thing is not a physical quality of the 
thing itself. It is only an agreement, or law, by which each is 
obliged to abstain from that which another has acquired. It is 
a right only in reference to other men. It presupposes more 
than one. It can only originate in agreement, a union of men, 
or society, and is regulated and controlled by government, when 
a government is established. Even now, things which are com- 
mon, belong to the first occupant, only by general consent, which 
is a rule tacitly agreed upon for the general good. In one sense, 
it is true, that both property and society may be called natural, 
since we are, evidently, designed by our Creator, for both.* 

There is a great deal of very weak argument on the subject of 
the rights of man in a state of nature. The phrases — right, 
state of nature, and natural rights, are very ambiguous, and may 
mean very different things. Perhaps we may fall into errors 
from this same source. But if people will argue from this im- 
aginary state of nature, we must consider their arguments, and 
endeavor to ascertain what weight is due to them. 

The address, it will be seen from the preceding extracts, 
admits, that previous to society, every man would have a right 
to say, whether he would join the society or not, and that no one 
could rightfully compel another to join it. Of course, in a state 
of nature and before society was formed, a majority could have 
no rights, whatever, over the minority. After a society is formed, 
which may be either by express compact, or tacit agreement, they 
may give the direction of their affairs to a king, to an aristocracy, 
or to a majority; but this can only be by virtue of the agreement, 
or, in the language of our Declaration of Independence, " the 
consent of the governed," and not from any divine right of kings 
and aristocracies, or any natural right of majorities. 

Government, or society may, in one sense, be said to be a 
divine institution, and may, also, in one sense, be called natural; 

* Puffendorff, vol. iv. lib. iv. ch. 11, and vol, iv. lib. iv. ch. 4, sec, 5. Rutheri'orth's Insti- 
tutes, lib. i. ch, 3, sec. 7. 



30 



but how a majority can be said to have any rights, either divine 
or natural, is difficult to see. They can have none but what the 
constitution or fundamental compact, and the laws give them. 

But, again it will be seen, that as far as Ehode Island is con- 
cerned, these arguments from a state of nature, about the natural 
right of every person to share in the formation of government, 
must proceed upon another assumption, that we are now in a 
state of nature, and have no organized society, or lawful govern- 
ment, to which the citizens are in any manner bound. They do, 
in fact, assume, that the present government of Ehode Island 
was never adopted by the people. 

Now, we either have a society or social compact already insti- 
tuted, we have a lawful government, or we have not; and are in 
this, so called, state of nature without any government. If we 
are not members of an organized society, then, from what has 
been said before, a majority have no right to govern at all, no 
other right but the revolutionary right of force. If we are 
members of an organized society, then a majority has no right 
but such as the existing constitution and laws give them. If, 
by the original, or existing constitution, the whole people have 
agreed that that constitution shall be altered by a majority, 
then a majority may alter it, but it is because the whole people 
have given them that power, and for that reason alone. If they 
have not given them that power, as in Ehode Island, then the 
right remains in the whole people. Governments were instituted 
for the protection of the whole people, for majorities can gener- 
ally protect themselves. How the consent of the whole people 
is to be expressed, we shall consider presently. A change of 
government made in any other manner, may be a revolution, but 
cannot be called legal. 

To the assertion, that every person has a natural right to share 
in the government, or to vote, the common and obvious answer 
is — if this is a natural right, why do you, at one blow, exclude 
one half of all society, the females; why do you exclude minors, 
colored persons, and the poor?* 

In answer to this, the address says, (p. 31,) "The first part of 
the objection, regarding minors, proves too much for the ob- 

* It is an observation of Burke, that by requiring any qualification at all, you exclude 
the poorest, and those who most need protection. Vol. iii. p. 198. 



31 



jectors; for, as the minor is debarred from the full enjoyment of 
the right of property also, until the age of twenty-one years, it 
might be argued with equal show of reason, that there is no 
natural right of property; for which right, the objectors strenu- 
ously contend." 

This might answer very well as an " argumentum ad hominem" 
to a man who believed the right of property to be a natural right, 
but if the remarks we have made upon this point are correct, 
this reply can avail nothing. 

The writer in the address allows, that some men are as well 
qualified to vote before twenty-one, as others are above that age; 
and he then proceeds to defend the exclusion of minors upon 
what is, in fact, the only true ground, expediency, or the public 
good, and the necessity of prescribing general rules, and refers 
to the universal practice of all civilized nations as its justification. 

In relation to the exclusion of women, Mr. Dorr rests its jus- 
tification, (p. 31,) "upon a just consideration of the best good 
of society including that of the sex itself," and upon "their 
own assent." 

To the remark, that in many of the free suffrage States a 
property qualification is required to be elected to office, the reply 
is, (p. 49,) "it is a sufficient answer to the objectors to say, that 
where the distinction does exist, it was made by the people them- 
selves in their original sovereign capacity." 

Thus are all those who reason from the rights of nature, 
obliged themselves to come back at last to the old doctrine, that 
the question, who shall share in the political power or adminis- 
tration of the government, is to be decided from expediency or 
considerations of the public good. And this question, in case 
of forming a government where none existed before, must be 
settled by all the parties to the social compact. In case of a 
government established by tacit consent or acquiescence, or by 
force, it must be decided by those in whose hands the power of 
the State already is. If any are oppressed, they have their 
appeal to the bar of public opinion, and the good sense of the 
people seldom fails, (though sometimes slowly) to redress the 
injury. If all peaceable means fail, and the oppression is suf- 
ficient to justify it, there remains the sacred right of revolution. 

But it will be said, even allowing that a majority of all the 



32 



men over twenty-one years of age, qualified and unqualified, had 
no power to change the government in this manner, the people's 
constitution received the votes of a majority of the freemen or 
qualified voters under the existing laws. The fact we will after- 
wards inquire into, and will now consider the present form of the 
assertion, that a majority of the qualified voters have a right to 
change the government at any time, and in any manner they 
choose, without consulting either the government or the minority. 

We are very apt to get our notions of the rights of majorities 
from our common practice of governing by majorities. After a 
government is formed, and the republican form adopted, as with 
us, and the power is placed in the hands of a body of men, in- 
stead of one or a few, the universal rule and practice is, that in 
the administration of the laws and deciding all ordinary cases, 
the will of the majority shall be considered as the will of the 
whole body. This is the only practicable rule in managing the 
affairs of an organized body of a number of men, and is adopted 
either expressly, by rule, or tacitly, by consent, from the neces- 
sity of the case; but then this majority must act according to 
the rules and fundamental laws upon which the government itself 
was organized. It is from seeing that the administration of the 
government in our country in all its details is carried on by ma- 
jorities, and this constantly going on before our eyes, that some 
come to imagine that there is some peculiar power inherent in, 
or natural to a majority, and that, as a republican principle, they 
have a right to change the government itself.* 

If any number of us were to meet to form an association for 
any purpose whatever, a majority would have no right to control 

* See Brownson's remarks on the manner in which majorities are usually managed. 
" These measures and candidates are rarely determined on by the spontaneous voice of the 
whole party. They are determined on by the few more active partizans, usually desig- 
nated party leaders. These cut and dry the policy of the party. The party may not ap- 
prove this policy, but it must adopt it, or endanger its success, and give ascendency to the 
opposite party; which will generally be regarded as the greater evil of the two. A major- 
ity of the more active members of the party, therefore, adopt what their leaders propose, 
pass resolutions in its favor, and rally the whole party to its support. The party, we will 
suppose, succeeds, elects its men, and carries its measures. Are these measures really 
carried by the majority of the whole people? Are they, in truth, expressions of the actual 
will of the majority? Not at all. They are, in truth, only the expressions of the will or 
the policy of the active minority of the party, which is itself but a lean majority of the 
whole people. If the actual opinion of those who, in both parties, are really opposed to 
them, could be collected, you would not nnfrequently have an overwhelming majority 
against them. In point of fact, what we call the decision of the majority in this country, 
is rarely any thing more than the decision of the active or adroit minority which controls 
the party, that, for the time being, chances to be in the ascendant. Universal suffrage, 
then, coupled with universal education, cannot secure even the expression of the will of 
the majority, to say nothingof giving us assurance that the will of the majority shall 
always be just and right."'— Boston Quarterly Review, vol. iv. p. 281-2. 



33 



the rest in forming the articles of association, but when once the 
association was formed, if there were no express rules for man- 
aging its business, we should "naturally" that is, from the 
necessity of the case, adopt the rule of majorities. We should 
adopt it as a rule of convenience. And this is the only connec- 
tion we know of between nature and a majority. 

Much of what we have said before will apply to the right now 
claimed for a majority of the qualified voters. A majority, 
whether of qualified or unqualified voters, can have no legal, 
constitutional, or conventional rights but such as the constitu- 
tion or social compact gives them;* and government being 
formed by the whole people for the protection of minorities as 
well as majorities, when once instituted it can only be changed 
by the whole people, or in such manner as they have agreed it 
shall be changed. 

There having been in Rhode Island no particular way desig- 
nated for changing the constitution, and the whole people never 
having given to a majority the right to make such a change, it 
would follow, that the majority in Rhode Island could not make the 
change. But, on the other hand, to require the consent of every 
individual to a change, would render change impossible. The 
existing government having been established by the whole people, 
and representing the whole people in their social capacity, minor- 
ities as well as majorities, they having delegated to it all political 
power, without limitation; when this gives its consent to the 
change, the consent of the whole people is given in the only 
practicable way it can be. 

But it may be said, if no change can be legally made without 
the consent of the legislature, it may be prevented forever. In- 
terested minorities may obtain the control of the legislature. 
True, such cases may happen, and we do not maintain that this or 
any other theory is entirely free from objections. But the theory 
of the legal or constitutional right of the majority to change, in 
any manner they choose, is liable in our view to fatal objections, f 

* See the very able remarks of Judge Upshur (now secretary of the navy,) on the rights 
of majorities, page 66 of the Debates of the Virginia Convention; and also in an Address 
delivered by him, July 2, 1841, before the literary societies of William and Mary College, 
page 23. 

t " An opinion which saps the foundation of all authority, which destroys all power, and, 
consequently, all society, cannot be admitted as a principle of reasoning or of conduct, in 
politics." — Burlamaque; Principles of Natural and Politic Law, vol. ii. lib. ii. ch. 6, sec. 8. 

5 



34 



In the case of the people's constitution, a few persons without 
any legal right whatever, took upon themselves to call a conven- 
tion, and to say how many delegates each town should have, and 
who should vote in choosing those delegates. It was managed 
in the same way a party caucus or convention is generally man- 
aged. 

A portion of the people chose delegates, and the convention 
thus assembled, made a constitution, and assumed the power to 
call town-meetings, and, strangest of all, assumed that highest 
attribute of sovereignty, the right to 'decide who should be ad- 
mitted to vote in adopting that constitution. There was, of 
course, no challenging of votes or legal means of detecting or 
punishing fraud, — the rest of the people considering the pro- 
ceedings illegal, took no part in them; and these persons, with- 
out any election or oath of office, then proceed to count the 
votes in their own way, and declare the result to be the adoption 
of their constitution.* 

Xow it is plain, that if the law is out of the case, mere num- 
bers cannot add to the right; that is, if five or ten men can call 
a convention, one man has as good a right; and if fifty or a 
hundred men without legal authority can make a constitution, 
and say how it shall be adopted, one man has the same right; 
for there is no law either of nature or of society which limits the 
number necessary to be concerned in such an undertaking. This, 
we believe, the friends of the people's constitution generally ad- 
mit: they maintain, that it is the adoption of the constitution 
by a majority, which alone gives it validity, and that it is of no 
consequence how it is proposed. 

But who is to settle who the sovereign people are? Those who 
proposed the people's constitution, limited the right of voting 
upon its adoption to American citizens, (which, of course, 
requires five years residence in the United States,) over twenty- 
one years of age. They did not expressly exclude females, but 
if females are to be counted, there can be no pretence that they 
obtained a majority. Now what upon the theory in question, is 

* These votes were at first offered for examination to the General Assembly, and lists of 
the voters in several of the towns were furnished to individuals who applied. Afterwards, 
all access was refused to them. It is obvious that the legislature cannot examine them 
without yielding the question of right; and private individuals are not now permitted to. 
So that they are effectually shut up from public scrutiny. 



35 



there to prevent any private individual framing a constitution 
and proposing it to the people, and asking females to vote upon 
it — for he would have the same right to do it, the People's Con- 
vention had. We have now a large party among us contending 
for women's rights. What would prevent this being done every 
day, as new notions arose and became popular? Why could not 
a majority of a religious sect establish their creed in a constitu- 
tion? Religious liberty is a part of our social compact in Rhode 
Island, if any thing is. They may, even now, do this by force, 
but we are speaking of constitutional right. 

If these positions are followed out in all their consequences, it 
would be seen that, upon such grounds, there could be no per- 
manence in any form of government whatever; and a govern- 
ment without some degree of permanence is no government at 
all. It may be said, indeed, that, in practice, these changes 
would not be frequent, that the people are not apt to change un- 
less there is some great cause to move them. But where is the 
security for this? Our country is, from time to time, swept over 
by excitements, political and religious, the advocates of which, 
while the fever is up, are very apt to think that the salvation of 
the republic depends upon the adoption of their particular no- 
tions. If a^ majority have not only the might, but can make 
right, what hinders these things? 

People will never undertake a revolution unless there be good 
cause; but once established that the majority have the legal and 
peaceable right now claimed, and that they can overturn not 
merely the ordinary laws, but the government and constitution 
itself, by putting a piece of paper in a ballot-box, or sending in 
their vote to any self-constituted meeting, and there is nothing 
to prevent changes being attempted every day, and the commu- 
nity would, of course, be kept in constant agitation by a few 
heated partizans. 

These remarks are sufficient to show that, in order to change 
the government legally and constitutionally, it is not only neces- 
sary that the existing government should give the consent of the 
whole society, and that a majority should act, but that the will 
of that majority should be legally and constitutionally expressed 
in the manner pointed out by the existing constitution and laws.* 

* " I think I give you a true description of a state, when I say, that a state is a legally 



36 



Otherwise there can be no security against fraud whatever, except 
the ipse dixit of these self-elected canvassers of the votes. And 
even then, we should be obliged to have recourse to physical 
strength, to settle all questions of doubt, so that we should, in 
reality, gain nothing by the adoption of the new doctrine. 

In the monarchical governments of Europe, there is such an 
aversion to all change which shall lessen the power or the privi- 
leges of the ruling few, and there is so much oppression in them, 
that perhaps it is natural the tendency here should be to the 
other extreme. 

There are, indeed, two parties among the advocates of the new 
doctrines. One party go the whole length, we have described, 
and maintain, that even if there is a mode pointed out for 
amending the constitution, that the majority are not bound by 
it, but can alter it in any manner, and at any time they choose. 
Another portion claim the right, because, they say, there is, in 
Rhode Island, no way of amending our constitution, but still 
hold that, if there was a mode prescribed, the people would be 
bound by it, as a compact. The legislature, they say, has no 
power to call a convention. Let them show, if they can. that 

organized people, subsisting, as such, from generation to generation, without end, giving 
through the forms of law, the wills of the many to become one sovereign will. It is a 

body politic, qualified to subsist by perpetual succession and accession There is, 

andfrom the nature of things, there can be no sovereign people without law: without that 
unity which the law gives them whereby they are enabled to act as one: and consequently, 
there can be no sovereign will that is not expressed through the forms of their corporate 

existence A sovereign will is a unit, is a mere legal entity: it has nowhere in any 

civilized countries any existence independent of law. In the constitutional monarchies of 
Europe, it has a mere legal existence; hence the legal maxim in England, that the king 
never dies, and can do no wrong. The moment that the sovereign will ceases to be a legal 
will, and becomes a mere personal will, you have nothing but a master, and a body^of 
slaves: you have no state at all, but only the semblance of one.'''— Chief Justice D 
Charge. 

" The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and alter their 
constitutions of government; but the constitution which, at any time exists, until changed 
by an explicit and authentic act of the whoU people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. The 
very idea of the power and right of the people to establish government, presupposes the 
duty of every individual to obey the established government. 

" All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and associations under 
whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, counteract or awe the 
regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this fun- 
damental principle, and of fatal tendency. They serve to organize faction, to give it an 
artificial and extraordinary force, to put in the place of the delegated will of the nation, 
the will of a party, often a small, but artful and enterprising minority of the community; 
and according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the public adminis- 
tration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incongruous projects of faction, rather than the 
organ of consistent and wholesome plans, digested by common counsels and modified by 
mutual interests. 

"However combinations and associations of the above description may now and then 
answer popular ends, they are likely, in the course of time and things, to become potent 
engines, by which cunning, ambitious and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the 
power of the people, and to usurp for themselves the government: destroying afterwards 
the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion."— President Washington'* 
Farewell Addres*. 



37 

the existing government of Rhode Island is not a government in 
the full meaning of the word, and the only mode in which the 
whole people can be represented and exercise their whole politi- 
cal power, which the} have delegated to it without limit. 

We have seen in the statement in the beginning of these 
remarks, that what, in most cases, is theory only, was. in our 
case, a fact: that there was truly, a social compact. Rhode 
Island was composed of separate settlements, each of which was 
formed by a voluntary compact, and after being united for a 
while by compact, again separated, and then again united, and 
in order to prevent future divisions, appointed agents to Eng- 
land, who drew up the charter of 1663, and obtained its ratifica- 
tion from Charles II. : that this charter was not only the work 
of the people in the outset, but was solemnly accepted by the 
whole people in mass. Thus did the people of Rhode Island, 
the whole people, establish a government. 

But it is said, that this charter, being derived from the English 
king, was annulled by the Revolution, and that we are now with- 
out any government which has ever received the sanction of the 
people, or been adopted by them: in a word, that it is only a 
government by force and sufferance, no rightful government at 
all. This argument would defeat its own purpose, for if our 
former social compact was dissolved, and we have now no legal 
government at all, how could a majority bind us? But. for the 
reasons we have just mentioned, this view cannot be sustained. 
The charter was not only the act of the king, but it was also 
the act of the people themselves. So far as it was the act of the 
king, the Revolution put an end to his authority. But, inas- 
much, as it was the act and compact of the people and the whole 
people, it remained with binding force, and was confirmed by 
universal consent and acquiescence. The object of the Revolu- 
tion, was not to dissolve society into its original elements, but only 
to separate one organized society or nation, from another which 
oppressed it. 

The argument is destructive in another point of view. Rhode 
Island has no legal government, because the Revolution put an 
end to the old social compact, and no new government was ever 
established by the people, or according to their doctrine, by a 
majority — then, by the same course of reasoning, the Constitu- 



38 

tion of the United States was never legally adopted by Rhode 
Island, for, as only qualified freemen voted for the convention 
which adopted it, a majority of the people never sanctioned it; 
and even if a majority had sanctioned it, such a majority could 
not bind us, unless we had a valid constitutional compact of our 
own, by virtue of which, a majority would have such a right. 

In arguing upon the doctrines of natural rights, we are aware, 
that we are arguing, in a great measure, upon mere theory; that 
the so called state of nature is mostly imaginary, and that gov- 
ernments, in the greater number of cases, instead of being the 
creatures of express compact, have been the results of conquest, 
or prescription. But our opponents argue from natural rights, 
and we are obliged to meet them upon their own grounds. The 
origin of some of our American governments, comes as near 
the idea of a strict, social compact, as perhaps ever happened. 
They actually entered into agreements, (and sometimes in writ- 
ing,) to form themselves into societies. And, as a new genera- 
tion grows up, they are, from the necessity of the case, presumed 
to give their consent by their acquiescence to become members 
of the society; and it is in this view, that it is most beautifully 
and expressively called by Coleridge, an "ever originating" 
compact. 

There is another argument nearly connected with the preced- 
ing, and which, from the frequency with which it is used, must 
be considered, by the revolutionary party, a strong one. They 
say, the Constitution of the United States guarantees to every 
State, a republican form of government. They then argue, (or 
generally assume,) that the present government of Rhode Island 
is not republican. 

They may mean, that the government of Rhode Island never 
was republican, or that it has, by some later change, lost its re- 
publican character. 

That the government of Rhode Island was considered as 
republican within the meaning of the constitution, at the time 
the State joined the Union, requires but little evidence to estab- 
lish. The fact of admission into the Union proves this. If it 
was not then republican, few of the States had republican gov- 
ernments at that time, for, in the greater part of them, the right 
of suffrage was very much restricted, and several of them had 



39 



never been confirmed by express acts of the whole people subse- 
quent to the Revolution. Mr. Madison (Federalist, No. 43, p. 
23P>,) observes, "The authority extends no further than to a 
guaranty of a republican form of government, which supposes a 
preexisting government of the form to be guarantied. As long, 
therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the 
States, they are guarantied by the Federal Constitution. When- 
ever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms, 
they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for 
the latter." 

In determining what constitutes a republican government, we 
must look to its meaning as it was understood by the wise men 
who formed our constitution, and not to the notions of modern 
theorisers and visionaries. Mr. Madison (Federalist, No. 39, p. 
204,) gives us his definition: "If we resort for a criterion to 
the different principles on which different forms of government 
are established, we may define a republic to be, or, at least, may 
bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers 
directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is 
administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for 
a limited period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such 
a government that it be derived from the great body of the so- 
ciety, not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class 
of it; otherwise, a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their 
oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the 
rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honor- 
able title of a republic." And in another place (No. 10, p. 53,) 
he defines a republic to be a "government in which the scheme 
of representation takes place," "the delegation of the govern- 
ment to a small number of citizens elected by the rest," distin- 
guishing it from a pure democracy. 

Now let us hear Mr. Dorr's definition in the Address before 
referred to, (p. 23.) "It is one of the essential parts of the 
definition of a republican government or representative democ- 
racy,* that it is a government resulting from the will of the 
majority, ascertained by a just and equal representation." 

If there is any force in this definition, there is not a State in 

* Judge Swift observes, that a representative democracy is a contradiction in terms. 
Vol. i. p. 21. 



40 

the Union which is at this time a republic, for in almost all of 
them there is more or less inequality of representation. In Ver- 
mont, and Connecticut, the representation is fixed without any 
regard to population whatever. In Connecticut, Hartford has 
12,793 inhabitants, New Haven, 14,390, and there are many 
towns of under 700 inhabitants; and yet each of the old towns 
has two, and the new towns one representative each. In Ver- 
mont, several towns have over 3,000, while there are several of 
under 500 inhabitants; and yet every town has one representa- 
tive and no more.* Of course, upon the new theory, these are 
aristocracies, and will have to be reformed. 

The assertion, that Rhode Island has not a republican govern- 
ment, must refer either to the fact that it has no written consti- 
tution except the charter, or to the fact, that there is some 
inequality in the representation, or to the assertion, that a 
majority of citizens of lawful age are excluded by the present 
laws from a share in political power. 

Our present charter derives all its validity from the act of the 
people; and instead of the legislature being the masters of the 
people, as is frequently asserted, by one branch being elected 
semi-annually, they are more dependent on the people than the 
legislature of any other State, and they exercise their power only 
as representing the whole people, the sovereign people. Until 
1818, Connecticut was in a similar situation, and had no consti- 
tution whatever, except a royal charter from this same graceless 
Charles II.; and Judge Swift observes, (System, vol. i. p. 55,) 
" Some visionary theorists have pretended, that we have no con- 
stitution because it has not been reduced to writing, and ratified 
by the people. It is, therefore, necessary to trace the constitu- 
tion of our government to its origin, for the purpose of showing 
its existence, that it has been accepted and approved of by the 
people, and is well known and precisely bounded.'' Connecticut 
was, like Rhode Island, composed of different settlements, each 

* In these States, the Senate is the more popular branch, but even there the representa- 
tion is not strictly according to population, but is subject to several limitations. Vermont 
has fourteen counties, and there are to be thirty senators, of which each county is enti- 
tled to one, and the rest are to be distributed to those counties having the greatest frac- 
tions. By the constitution, Grand Isle county, which has by the last census a population 
of 3,800, had one senator, and Windsor county, which, by the last census, had 40,300 inhab- 
itants, had only four senators. What the new apportionment is I know not. In districting 
the Senate of Connecticut, there is a nearer approach to a ratio of population, but even 
there, there are considerable inequalities. 



41 



of which was formed by express compact, and which were after- 
wards united together. " The application of the people for this 
charter, and their voluntary acceptance of it, gave efficacy' to 
the government it constituted, and not the royal signature." 
He then proceeds to observe, that so far as it was the mere act 
of the king, a royal charter, it lost its force after the Revolution. 

The doctrine which makes perfect equality of representation 
essential to the definition of a republic, proceeds upon the ground 
that numbers alone are to be considered in the formation of a 
constitution — a doctrine destructive of all good government. It 
is confounding republican and democratic, two very distinct 
things. It has always been thought wise in framing constitu- 
tions of government, so to frame them as to protect all the dif- 
ferent interests of the State, and to prevent any one from 
preponderating over, and swallowing up, all the rest. These 
interests may be pecuniary, civil or religious, sometimes general, 
and sometimes local; and of whatever sort, are salutary checks 
upon each other. Regard is also to be had, in distributing rep- 
resentative numbers, to the greater or less degree of power, of 
combination, and facility of acting in concert. 

In all our State governments the supreme power is vested in 
more than one body, generally in a Senate and House of Repre- 
sentatives, and in concurrence with the executive; and these 
different branches are elected by different constituencies. This 
is done to provide checks on power, and to prevent hasty and 
inconsiderate legislation. But another and most important view 
of the propriety of this division of power and difference in the 
manner of election, is taken by Mr. Calhoun in his speech of 
February 28, 1842, and which will be best expressed in his own 
words. "What, then, is to be done, if neither the majority 
nor the minority, the greater nor less part, can be safely entrusted 
with the exclusive control? what but to vest the powers of the 
government in the whole, the entire people; to make it, in truth 
and reality, the government of the people, instead of the gov- 
ernment of a dominant over a subject part — be it greater or less — 
of the whole people, self-government; and if this should prove 
impossible in practice, then to make the nearest approach to it, 
by requiring the concurrence in the government of the greatest 
6 



42 



possible number consistent with the great ends for which govern- 
ment was instituted, justice and security, within and without. 
But how is that to be effected? not certainly by considering the 
whole community as one, and taking its sense as a whole by a 
single process, which, instead of giving the voice of all, can 
give but that of a part. There is but one way by which it can 
possibly be accomplished; and that is, by a judicious and wise 
division and organization of the government and community 
with reference to its different and conflicting interests, and by 
taking the sense of each part separately, and the concurrence of 
all as the voice of the whole. Each may be imperfect in itself; 
but if the construction be good, and all the keys skillfully touched, 
there will be given out in one blended and harmonious whole, the 
true and perfect voice of the people Kegarding them sep- 
arately, neither [branch] truly represents the sense of the com- 
munity, and each is imperfect in itself; but when united, and 
the concurring voice of each is made necessary to enact laws, the 
one corrects the defects of the other; and instead of the less 
popular derogating from the more popular, the two together give 
a more free and perfect utterance to the voice of the people than 
either could separately." "The great question is, how is due 
preponderance to be given to the power of the majority without 
subjecting the whole, in time, to its unlimited sway? which 
brings up the question, is there any where in our complex sys- 
tem of government, a guard, check, or contrivance, sufficiently 
strong to arrest so fearful a tendency of the government? Or to 
express it in more direct and intelligible language, Is there any 
where in the system, a more full and perfect expression of the 
voice of the people of the States, calculated to counteract this 
tendency to the concentration of all the powers of the govern- 
ment in the will of the numerical majority, resulting from the 
partial and imperfect expression of their voice through its organs? 
Yes, fortunately, doubly fortunately, there is; not only a more 
full and perfect, but a full and perfect expression to be found in 
the constitution, acknowledged by all to be the fundamental and 
supreme law of the land. It is full and perfect, because it is the 
expression of the voice of each State, adopted by the separate 
assent of each, by itself, and for itself; and is the voice of all, 
by being that of each component part, united and blended into 



43 



one harmonious whole. But it is not only full and perfect, but 
as just, as it is full and perfect; for, combining the sense of each, 
and therefore all, there is nothing left on which injustice, or 
oppression, or usurpation, can operate." The necessity and ad- 
vantages of having the different branches of the law-making 
power elected by different constituencies and different interests, 
so that, when a law is enacted by their concurrent voice, it shall 
not express the will of a mere tyrannical majority, but shall ex- 
press the voice, as nearly as practicable, of the whole, by thus 
collecting the sense of the whole through the subordinate parts, 
are dwelt upon by Mr. Calhoun in this and other places.* 

As to the assertion, that, by the present laws, a majority of 
American citizens, of lawful age, are excluded, the fact has 
always been denied, f Besides, the law does not exclude them. 
It is in their power to bring themselves within the qualification. 
Mr. Dorr, himself, admits the necessity of acting upon general 

*" Appeals to patriotism and philanthropy will always make you most effective as an 
orator or a writer; hut patriotism and philanthropy, when carried to the polls, or into the 
legislative hall, are identified hy each man, with the special protection by government of 
his peculiar interest. Patriotism and philanthropy with the planter, are in his cotton bags; 
with the farmer, in his wheat field; with the manufacturer, in his spindle and loom; with 
the banker, in his notes, and with the merchant, in his ship or counting-room. What 
most benefits me, is most patriotic and for humanity. No government will work well that 
docs not recognize this fact, and which is not shaped to meet it, and counteract its mis- 
chievous tendency/' — Boston Quarterly Review, vol. v. p. 36. 

"To make the\constitution, is not to draw up the written instrument, but to organize 
the body politic, to constitute its several powers; and if we really intend it to be a consti- 
tution, so to organize the State as to always have a negative power capable of arresting 
the positive power whenever it is disposed to exceed the bounds prescribed to it. The 
constitution, then, must virtually consist in the manner in which the different interests, 
classes, sections, or natural divisions of the community, are organized in relation to the 

government The whole people, through the majority, are the positive power, the 

governing power; the negative power must besought in the parts, and secured by so or- 
ganizing the parts, that each part, when an oppressive measure is attempted, may have an 
effectual veto on the action of the majority or positive power." — Ibid, vol. v. p. 44. 

"To introduce some distinction of the kind, some contrivance for taking, in addition to 
the sense of the absolute majority, the sense of the natural divisions of the community, 

is, and should be the aim of every statesman The contrivance must vary with 

localities, and the peculiar habits, tastes, customs, and pursuits of the community. The 
same contrivance will not answer for every community. Nor can it any where be arbitra- 
rily introduced. " — Ibid, vol. iv. p. 287. 

" Many things are thought to be democratic, against which a wise statesman will set his 
face. It is not democracy we want, but good government, a government which secures to 
each individual by effective guaranties, the free and full enjoyment of all his natural rights. 
These guaranties, which are the substance, may be lost while we are in pursuit of abstrac 
tions and theoretic unity, which are often but mere shadows. All good government is 
founded on compromise, and is more or less complicated. To simplify it is nothing but to 
render it absolute."— Ibid, vol. iv. p. 288. 

" We repeat to them what we never cease to repeat, and what we have ever occasion to 
repeat, that between popular sovereignty, and individual liberty, there is a wide difference; 
and that, to clear the way for the~free, unobstructed dominion of the people as civil 
society, is but clearing the way for anarchy or despotism."— Ibid, vol. iv. p. 3(58. 

"The ordinary power of government and legislation in a government like ours, is the 
will or assent ot the majority. Now if this same majority make the constitution, or may 
unmake it at will, the constitution can, at best, impose but a temporary check on its will. 

Then the constitution is nothing but what the majority choose to make it, and, 

consequently, we are just as much under the absolute majority, as we should be in case we 
had no constitution."— Ibid, vol. iv. p. 284. 

tSee Appendix. 



44 



rules. Universal suffrage prevails nowhere. It is restricted, 
more or less, in every State. It is, therefore, merely a question 
of expediency and degree, as to where the line shall be drawn. 
The government was, in fact, established by the great body of 
the people, and continued and confirmed by their repeated con- 
sent and acquiescence; and it is contended, and confidentially 
believed, by many, that those who are actually qualified to vote 
now, constitute a majority of the male population over twenty- 
one, after excluding foreigners, transient persons, lunatics, pau- 
pers, &c. If Rhode Island is not a republic for these reasons, 
upon what ground can the other States, and especially the south- 
ern ones, stand? 

It would almost seem as if Mr. Madison had been endowed 
with the spirit of prophecy. He has anticipated the case of 
Rhode Island. Federalist, No. 43, p. 237: — "At first view, it 
might not seem to square with the republican theory, to suppose 
that a majority have not the right, or that a minority will have 
the force to subvert a government, and, consequently, that the 
federal interposition can never be required but when it would be 
improper. But theoretic reasoning in this, as in most other 
cases, must be qualified by the lessons of practice. Why may 
not illicit combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed, as 
well by a majority of a State, especially a small State, as by a 
majority of a county or a district of the same State? . . . May 
it not happen, in fine, that the minority of citizens may become 
the majority of persons by the accession of alien residents, of a 
casual concourse of adventurers, or of those whom the constitu- 
tion of the State has not admitted to the right of suffrage?" 

Federalist, No. 10. p. 50: — "By a faction, I understand a 
number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minor- 
ity of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common 
impulse of passion or interest, adverse to the rights of other 
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the com- 
munity. . . . When a majority is included in a faction, the form 
of popular government enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion, 
or interest, both the public good, and the rights of other citizens." 

The case of the admission of Michigan into the Union, is 
often quoted in support of the late movement in Rhode Island. 
All the facts connected with it are seldom stated. 



45 



Michigan, being a Territorial government, the Territorial leg- 
islature, January 25, 1835, passed "An act to enable the people 
of Michigan to form a constitution and State government," in 
pursuance of which, a constitution was formed by a convention 
of the people at Detroit, in May, 1835. 

By the act of congress, of June 15, 1836, " to establish the 
northern boundary line of the State of Ohio, and to provide for 
the admission of the State of Michigan into the Union upon the 
conditions therein expressed," certain conditions, as to boundary 
lines, &c, were prescribed to be complied with, or assented to, 
before their admission. The act required that these conditions 
should "receive the assent of a convention of delegates elected 
by the people of said State for the sole purpose of giving the 
assent herein required," and upon such assent being given, the 
president was to declare it by proclamation. 

In accordance with this act, the legislature, under the State 
constitution, called a convention, which met at Ann Arbor, Sep- 
tember, 1836, and rejected the conditions. 

In December, 1836, a convention of delegates, elected by the 
people of their own motion, and called by no legal authority, 
met, and voted to accept the conditions. The proceedings were 
communicated to President Jackson, who laid them before con- 
gress, and Michigan was admitted. 

Michigan was, at this time, without any government at all, 
recognized by congress. Congress would not recognize them as 
a State, until they had been admitted, and did not recognize 
their legislature as having any authority to call a convention, or 
their constitution as having any validity whatever. Furthermore, 
the act of congress required, that the assent should be given by 
a convention of delegates, elected by the people, and did not 
prescribe any particular manner in which the convention should 
be called or elected. 

All these facts were stated, and the points made, in the letter 
from the president of the convention to President Jackson. 
The act, he says, "does not designate any power or authority 
known among the people of the State, whether executive or leg- 
islative, by which such convention of delegates should be called 
together for acting on the premises. The condition prescribed 
as a preliminary to the admission of Michigan into the Union, 



46 



had not, until now, been complied with, and no absolute recog- 
nition of our State authorities had been made by any branch of 
the national government. The Territorial executive had been 
withdrawn, the Territorial legislature had ceased, and no power 
remained as recognized by congress, but the people of Michigan 
in their sovereign capacity, by which the convention of delegates 
should be called to yield compliance with the fundamental con- 
dition of admission as provided in the second section of the act 
of congress. Had the third section of the said act designated 
by whom or by what power the said convention should be ordered, 
the mode would have met the cheerful compliance of the people 
of Michigan ; but an implied recognition of our constitutional 
authorities by congress, is not justified in the whole scope of the 
act aforesaid, and might be deemed too broad a construction, 
bearing on a question so vitally important to the people of Mich- 
igan. Left, then, to ourselves, we have considered it proper, 
respectfully, and as a full compliance with the spirit of the third 
section of the act of congress of June 15, 1836, to originate with 
and from the people themselves, through the expressed sanction 
of our executive, the convention of delegates required by said act." 

At the regular election for State officers in November, after 
the first convention, the question of assent or dissent to the con- 
ditions required by congress, was made the test question. Hav- 
ing, in this way, fully ascertained the views of the people, the 
calling of another convention was recommended by primary 
meetings, elections for delegates were held, which were con- 
ducted in all respects, as the ordinary elections, and the votes 
were canvassed and counted by the county boards, as in other 
cases, according to the Territorial law. 

The convention themselves, in the act declaring their assent, 
express themselves in the preamble thus: " whereas, no authority 
or power is designated in said act of congress by which said con- 
vention of delegates shall be called or convened; but in the third 
section of said act, the right of the people of Michigan to elect 
said delegates without auy previous action of their constituted 
authorities, is clearly recognized and manifest, and whereas, this 
convention originated with, and speaks the voice of a great ma- 
jority of the people of Michigan;" &c. 

Upon these grounds, and under these circumstances, Michigan 



47 



was admitted. Some of the members did, indeed, in their 
speeches, express very radical opinions, and many of them were, 
doubtless, influenced by party motives, as it was during a most 
violent contest for the presidency. And even if it had been de- 
cided upon the ground of right alone, the two cases are not sim- 
ilar, for Rhode Island has an established government recognized 
by the United States, and Michigan had no government at all 
recognized by congress, and no government was subverted in 
this case by the action of the majority. 

Many quotations are brought by the advocates of the people's 
constitution, from various legal writers, to support their claims. 
But, upon examination, the greater part of them may be reduced 
to two classes: first, the greater part assert that the theoretical 
"sovereignty" resides in the people, the whole people, and that 
they have a right to resume the powers of government, and to 
alter or change the constitution; a position which is asserted in 
almost all the State constitutions, and which no one denies: 
secondly, quotations from writers who were treating of the con- 
stitutions of States, where the existing constitution already gave 
the majority the right to alter it. In some, also, the right is 
asserted for. the majority, in vague and indefinite language, as a 
matter of physical strength, a sort of revolutionary right, while, 
in fact, the right of revolution belongs to oppressed minorities 
as much as to majorities. 

The revolutionary party in Rhode Island have obtained a 
gaeat deal of sympathy abroad, from several circumstances. 
They have assumed the name of "the people," to cover all their 
doings, and claim to be the exclusive advocates of extension of 
suffrage, and of the doctrine of the "sovereignty of the people," 
against what they represent as the tyranny of a landed aristoc- 
racy.* Besides the advantage which their assuming a popular 
name has given them, they have derived much assistance from 
the assertion, too readily believed abroad, that the present gov- 
ernment was resisting, by all the means in its power, any exten- 
sion of suffrage; an assertion sufficiently refuted by the statement 
of facts before given. They have taken good care to mix together 

* The freeholders of Rhode Island, nine-tenths of whom are very far from being; wealthy, 
must have been as much surprised to find that they had been aristocrats all their lives 
without knowing it, as the man in the play was, when lie made the discovery that he had 
been talking prose all his life without knowing it. 



48 



the questions of extension of suffrage, and the right of the ma- 
jority, well knowing that the former would find friends every 
where in other States, and that the latter would stand in some 
need of assistance. But now, that the established government 
has yielded all their demands as to extension of suffrage, only 
requiring residence, without any property qualification or even 
payment of taxes, — and the question of the right of the majority 
is left to stand upon its own merits, — it is to be hoped that it 
will receive the careful and anxious consideration of all who feel 
an interest in the permanence of republican institutions. The 
doctrine may be destined to become popular and prevail, because 
it has the appearance of being democratic; but its consequences 
appear to lead — and that at no very distant period — to centraliza- 
tion and despotism. 



APPENDIX 



No. 1. 

DR. PALEY ON THE RIGHT OF REVOLUTION. 

Dr. Paley, after examining the doctrine of compact, and 
rejecting it on the ground that it is theory only, and dangerous 
in its application, proceeds to give his own views of the duty of 
submission to government, as founded on " the will of God, as 
collected from expediency. " 

" The steps by which the argument proceeds are few and 
direct. ' It is the will of God that the happiness of human life 
be promoted;' this is the first step, and the foundation, not only 
of this, but of every moral conclusion. ' Civil society conduces 
to that end;' this is the second proposition. i Civil societies can- 
not be upheld, unless in each, the interest of the whole so- 
ciety be binding upon every part and member of it;' this is the 
third step, and conducts us to the conclusion, namely, 'that so 
long as the established government cannot be resisted or changed 
without public inconveniency, it is the will of God (which will 
universally determines our duty) that the established government 
be obeyed,' and no longer. 

" This principle being admitted, the justice of every particular 
case of resistance, is reduced to a computation of the quantity 
of the danger and grievance on the one side, and of the proba- 
bility and expense of redressing it on the other 

" We proceed to point out some easy, but important inferences 
which result from the substitution of public expediency into the 
place of all implied compacts, promises, or conventions whatso- 
ever. 

7 



50 



" I. It may be as much a duty at one time to resist govern- 
ment, as it is at another to obey it; to wit, whenever more 
advantage will, in our opinion, accrue to the community from 
resistance, than mischief. 

"II. The lawfulness of resistance, or the lawfulness of a 
revolt, does not depend alone upon the grievance which is sus- 
tained or feared, but also upon the probable expense and event 
of the contest. They who concerted the revolution in England, 
were justifiable in their counsels, because, from the apparent 
disposition of the nation, and the strength and character of the 
parties engaged, the measure was likely to be brought about with 
little mischief or bloodshed; whereas, it might have been a ques- 
tion with many friends of their country, whether the injuries 
then endured and threatened, would have authorized the renewal 
of a doubtful civil war. 

" III. Irregularity in the first foundation of a State, or sub- 
sequent violence, fraud, or injustice in getting possession of the 
supreme power, are not sufficient reasons for resistance after the 
government is once peaceably settled. , . . . . 

"IV. Not every invasion of the subject's rights, or liberty, 
or of the constitution; not every breach of promise, or of oath; 
not every stretch of prerogative, abuse of power, or neglect of 
duty by the chief magistrate, or by the whole, or any branch of 
the legislative body, justifies resistance, unless these crimes draw 
after them public consequences of sufficient magnitude to out- 
weigh the evils of civil disturbance. Nevertheless, every viola- 
tion of the constitution ought to be watched with jealousy, and 
resented as such, beyond what the quantity of estimable damage 
would require or warrant; because a known and settled usage of 
governing affords the only security against the enormities of un- 
controlled dominion, and because this security is weakened by 
every encroachment which is made without opposition, or op- 
posed without effect. 

" V. No usage, law, or authority whatever, is so binding that 
it need or ought to be continued, when it may be changed with 
advantage to the community. The family of the prince, the 
order of succession, the prerogative of the crown, the form and 
parts of the legislature, together with the respective powers, 
office, duration, and mutual dependency of the several parts, are 



51 



all only so many laws, mutable like other laws, whenever expedi- 
ency requires, either by the ordinary act of the legislature, or if 
the occasion deserve it, by the interposition of the people." — 
Moral Philosophy, lib. vi. ch. 4. 

In the latter clause, it is to be recollected, that Paley is refer- 
ring to the condition of England, where, in theory, the parlia- 
ment is omnipotent, and has power to change not only the 
ordinary laws, but the form and component parts of the legisla- 
ture itself, which in England are mere laws or acts of parliament. 
We have also observed elsewhere, that the government of Rhode 
Island, and some of the other States, were originally compacts 
made by the whole people; and that, therefore, in this country, 
the doctrine of compact is not always a mere theory. 



No. 2. 

president tyler's first letter. 
To His Excellency, the Governor of Rhode Island: 

Sir: — Your letter, dated the 4th inst., was handed me on 
Friday by Mr.. Whipple, who, in company with Mr. Francis and 
Mr. Potter, called upon me on Saturday, and placed me, both 
verbally and by writing, in possession of the prominent facts 
which have led to the present unhappy condition of things in 
Rhode Island; — a state of things which every lover of peace and 
good order must deplore. I shall not adventure the expression 
of an opinion upon those questions of domestic policy, which 
seem to have given rise to the unfortunate controversies between 
a portion of the citizens and the existing government of the 
State. They are questions of municipal regulation, the adjust- 
ment of which belongs exclusively to the people of Rhode Island, 
and with which this government can have nothing to do. For 
the regulation of my conduct, in any interposition which I may 
be called upon to make, between the government of a State and 
any portion of its citizens who may assail it with domestic vio- 
lence, or may be in actual insurrection against it, I can only look 
to the Constitution and laws of the United States, which plainly 



52 



declare the obligations of the executive department, and leave 

IT NO ALTERNATIVE AS TO THE COURSE IT SHALL PURSUE. 

By the fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitution 
of the United States, it is provided, that the United States shall 
guaranty to every State in this Union a republican form of gov- 
ernment, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and, 
on the application of the legislature, or executive, (when the 
legislature cannot be convened,) against domestic violence. And 
by the act of congress, approved on the 28th February, 1795, 
it is declared — that in case of an insurrection in any State against 
the government thereof, it shall be lawful for the President of the 
United States, upon application of the legislature of such State, 
or of the executive, (when the legislature cannot be convened,) 
to call forth such number of the militia of any other State or 
States as may be applied for, as he may judge sufficient to sup- 
press such insurrection. By the third section of the same act, 
it is provided that, whenever it may be necessary, in the judgment 
of the president, to use the military force hereby directed to be 
called forth, the president shall forthwith, by proclamation, com- 
mand such insurgents to disperse, and retire peaceably to their 
respective abodes, within a reasonable time. 

By the act of March 3, 1807, it is provided, " that in all cases 
of insurrection or obstruction to the laws, either of the United 
States or any individual State, or Territory, where it is lawful 
for the President of the United States to call forth the militia 
for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection, or of causing 
the laws to be duly executed, it shall be lawful for him to employ, 
for the same purposes, such part of the land or naval force of 
the United States as shall be judged necessary, having first ob- 
served all the prerequisites of the law in that respect." 

This is the first occasion, so far as the government of a State 
and its people are concerned, on which it has become necessary 
to consider of the propriety of exercising these high and most 
important constitutional and legal functions. By a careful con- 
sideration of the above-recited acts of congress, your excellency 
will not fail to see, that no power is vested in the executive of the 
United States to anticipate insurrectionary movements against 
the government of Ehode Island, so as to sanction the interpo- 
sition of the military authority, but that there must be an actual 



53 



insurrection manifested by lawless assemblages of the people or 
otherwise, to whom a proclamation may be addressed, and who 
may be required to betake themselves to their respective abodes. 
I have, however, to assure your excellency, that should the time 
arrive, (and my fervent prayer is that it may never come,) when 
an insurrection shall exist against the government of Ehode 
Island, and a requisition shall be made upon the executive of the 
United States to furnish that protection which is guarantied to 
each State by the Constitution and laws, I shall not be found 

TO SHRINK FROM THE PERFORMANCE OF A DUTY, WHICH, WHILE 
IT WOULD BE THE MOST PAINFUL, IS, AT THE SAME TIME, THE 

most imperative. / have also to say that, in such a contingency, 
the executive could not look into real or supposed defects of the 
existing government, in order to ascertain whether some other plan 
of government proposed for adoption was better suited to the ivants, 
and more in accordance with the wishes of any portion of her cit- 
izens. To throw the executive power of this government into any 
such controversy, would be to make the president the armed arbi- 
trator between the people of the different States and their consti- 
tuted authorities, and might lead to an usurped power, dangerous 
alike to the stability of the State governments and the liberties of 
the people. ^ 

It will be my duty, on the contrary, to respect the requisitions 
of that government which has been recognized as the existing gov- 
ernment of the State through all time past, until I shall be advised 
in regular manner, that it has been altered and abolished, and 
another substituted in its place, by legal and peaceable proceedings, 
adopted and pursued by the authorities and people of the State. 

Nor can I readily bring myself to believe that any such con- 
tingency will arise, as shall render the interference of this gov- 
ernment at all necessary. The people of the State of Rhode 
Island have been too long distinguished for their love of order 
and of regular government, to rush into revolution, in order to 
obtain a redress of grievances, real or supposed, which a govern- 
ment under which their fathers lived in peace, would not in due 
season redress. No portion of her people will be willing to 
drench her fair fields with the blood of their own brethren, in 
order to obtain a redress of grievances which their constituted 
authorities cannot, for any length of time resist, if properly 



54 



appealed to by the popular voice. None of them will be willing 
to set an example, in the bosom of this Union, of such frightful 
disorder, such needless convulsions of society, such danger to 
life, liberty and property, and likely to bring so much discredit 
on the character of popular governments. My reliance on the 
virtue, intelligence and patriotism of her citizens, is great and 
abiding, and I will not doubt but that a spirit of conciliation 
will prevail over rash counsels, that all actual grievances will 
be promptly redressed by the existing government, and that 
another bright example will be added to the many already pre- 
vailing among the North American republics, of change without 
revolution, and a redress of grievances without force or violence. 

I tender to your excellency assurances of my high respect and 
consideration. John Tyler. 

Washington, April 11, 1842. 



No. 3. 



PRESIDENT TYLERS SECOND LETTER. 

To the Governor of the State of Rhode Island : 

Washington City, May 7, 1842. 

Sir: — Your letter of the 4th inst., transmitting resolutions of 
the legislature of Rhode Island, informing me that there existed 
in that State " certain lawless assemblages of a portion of the 
people," for the purpose of subverting the laws and overthrow- 
ing the existing government, and calling upon the executive 
"forthwith to interpose the power and authority of the United 
States to suppress such insurrectionary and lawless assemblages, 
and to support the existing government and laws, and protect 
the State from domestic violence," was handed me, on yesterday, 
by Messrs. Randolph and Potter. 

I have to inform your excellency in reply, that my opinions as 
to the duties of this government to protect the State of Rhode 
Island against domestic violence, remain unchanged. Yet, from 
information received by the executive since your despatches came 
to hand, I am led to believe that the lawless assemblages to which 
reference is made, have already dispersed, and that the danger 



55 



of domestic violence is hourly diminishing, if it has not wholly 
disappeared. I have with difficulty brought myself at any time 
to believe, that violence would be resorted to, or an exigency 
arise, which the unaided power of the State could not meet; 
especially as I have, from the first, felt persuaded, that your ex- 
cellency, as well as others associated with yourself in the admin- 
istration of the government, would exhibit a temper of concilia- 
tion as well as of energy and decision. To the insurgents 
themselves it ought to be obvious, when the excitement of the 
moment shall have passed away, that changes achieved by regular, 
and, if necessary, repeated appeals to the constituted authorities, 
in a country so much under the influence of public opinion, and 
by recourse to argument and remonstrance, are more likely to 
ensure lasting blessings than those accomplished by violence and 
bloodshed on one day, and liable to overthrow, by similar agents, 
on another. 

I freely confess, that I should experience great reluctance in 
employing the military power of this government against any 
portion of the people; but, however painful the duty, I have to 
assure your excellency, that if resistance is made to the execution 
of the laws of Khode Island, by such force as the civil posse 
shall be unable to overcome, it will be the duty of this govern- 
ment to enforce the constitutional guarantee — a guarantee given 
and adopted mutually by all the original States, of which Rhode 
Island was one, and which, in the same way, has been given and 
adopted by each of the States since admitted into the Union. 
And if any exigency of lawless violence shall actually arise, the 
executive government of the United States, on the application 
of your excellency, under the authority of the resolutions of the 
legislature already transmitted, will stand ready to succor the 
authorities of the State in their efforts to maintain a due respect 
for the laws. I sincerely hope, however, that no such exigency 
may occur, and that every citizen of Rhode Island will manifest 
his love of peace and good order, by submitting to the laws, and 
seeking a redress of grievances by other means than intestine 
commotions. 

I tender to your excellency assurances of my distinguished 
consideration. 

John Tyler. 



56 



No. 4. 

EXAMINATION OF THE FACT OF THE MAJORITY CLAIMED FOR 
THE PEOPLE'S CONSTITUTION. 

Its advocates claim that the people's constitution received the 
votes of a majority of American citizens in the State, over 
twenty-one years of age, and also a majority of the legally qual- 
ified freemen. In proof of this, they appeal, first, to the return 
and canvass of the votes by their own convention in January; 
and, secondly, to their having succeeded in defeating the land- 
holders', or legal constitution, as it was called, in March, 1842. 
Let us examine both these assertions. 

The circumstances, under which the vote was given for the 
people's constitution, in December, 1841, have already been 
stated. The party was supposed to have for its object extension 
of suffrage alone, and few, at least, in the country part of the 
State, except its leaders, suspected any ulterior design. A great 
number, therefore, who were sincerely in favor of extension of 
suffrage, gave their votes for it as a mere expression of their 
opinion, never thinking that the constitution could go into effect. 
That this was the case with a great number, we think will appear 
from the reasons we shall offer presently. 

But it has, also, been charged, that there were great frauds 
committed in taking the vote; and it certainly offered great 
facilities for fraud. There was no challenging of votes, because 
the opposite party refused to take any part in it. The voting- 
was, for the first three days, in open town-meeting, and then, 
for the three following days, all the active friends of the cause 
exerted themselves in going around and procuring the signatures 
of as many as they could, and sending in their names to the 
moderators. Between four and five thousand were obtained in 
this way, in the last three days. 

The census of 1840 makes the number of free white males in 
the State, over twenty-one years of age, as near as can be com- 
puted, 25,674; free colored males, over twenty-four }'ears of age, 
668. In calculating the number necessary to make a majority, 
a deduction of 3,000 has generally been made from this, for for- 
eigners not naturalized, paupers, &c. 



57 

The greatest number of freemen who ever voted at any elec- 
tion, was 8,622, at the presidential election, in November, 1840. 
But, in the country towns especially, the population is scattered, 
and there is seldom a full attendance, and, by calculating the num- 
ber of voters and of absentees in several towns, and applying the 
same ratio to the State, the number of legally qualified voters, 
under the old laws, has been variously estimated at from eleven 
to twelve thousand. The number of freemen, claimed to have 
voted for the people's constitution, is 4,960. On the tickets, 

which they voted, were printed the following words: " I am 

qualified to vote according to the existing laws of the State." 
And it has been said, that a great many of the non-freeholders 
forgot to insert the not. 

In the town of Newport, they have long been charged with 
committing the greatest frauds, and the reason they have never 
attempted to disprove these charges is, probably, because they 
could not be refuted. They claimed to have obtained 1,207 
votes for the people's constitution, of whom they say 317 were 
freemen. 

In making up the whole number of 1,207, they took the 
names of the soldiers at the United States fort, of the people at 
work for the government at Fort Adams, and of people who had 
been, for a long time, gone to sea, or absent from the State. 
And, from an actual and careful examination of the list of their 
voters, it is estimated by a person, who is probably better quali- 
fied to judge than any other man in that town, that not more 
than 750, at most, out of the 1,207, were qualified to vote even 
upon the very liberal terms of the people's constitution, which 
admitted foreigners to vote for it, and required no specific period 
of residence. And when, only three months afterwards, in 
March, 1842, the vote was taken upon the legal constitution, 
and every person, who had resided in the State two years, was 
admitted to vote, and only foreigners and the transient popula- 
tion excluded, the people's party, notwithstanding they brought 
every man to the polls, could only obtain 361 votes against it. 
Here is a falling off from 1,207, when they took the vote in their 
own w T ay, to 361, when it was taken in legal town-meeting, where 
the votes were challenged, and the transient population excluded. 



58 



And both parties together, at this same town-meeting, could only 
obtain 1,091 votes, while the people's party claimed to have ob- 
tained for theirs, 1,207 votes. 

Again; they claim to have obtained, in Newport, 317 freemen 
for the people's constitution. The same gentleman, before re- 
ferred to, who personally knows almost every freeman in the 
town, estimates that at least ninety of these were no freemen at 
all. And, of the others, a great number voted merely as an ex- 
pression of opinion, and some for party purposes. How else, if 
there was no fraud, can it be accounted for, that in the legal town- 
meeting, where the very same freemen voted, subject, however, 
to a legal scrutiny, that this vote fell off from 317 to 102, and 
that both parties together could only obtain 475. The town- 
meeting of December, the people's party had all their own way. 
The other was conducted according to law, although the same 
people voted, and every effort was made on both sides. 

Such frauds as these would be most likely to be committed in 
the cities and large manufacturing towns, such as Newport, 
Providence, Smithfield, Cumberland, Warwick, &c. In a great 
many of the country towns, the vote was probably very fairly 
conducted. 

The convention, on counting their votes, declared the whole 
number, freeholders and non-freeholders, to be 13,944; and that 
their constitution was adopted by a majority of the American 
citizens over twenty-one. 

The people's party did, indeed, offer all their votes to the ex- 
amination of the General Assembly, and it has been triumph- 
antly proclaimed abroad, that the Assembly, by refusing to 
receive or examine them, had waived all right to dispute the fact 
of a majority. But it is to be recollected, that the General As- 
sembly considered all the proceedings illegal, and they could not 
receive the votes without giving up the principle they contended 
for. The fact of their being a majority, has always been denied 
by the other party. 

The People's Convention, at their meeting, January 13, 1842, 
by resolution, authorized the secretaries to copy any part of the 
registry of the votes, or of the votes themselves, upon the appli- 
cation of any person. Several individuals, accordingly, obtained 
lists of those who had voted in their own towns, and commenced 



59 



examining them. But a stop was soon put to this, and, at a 
meeting of some of the suffrage party in Providence, they actu- 
ally undertook to overrule the orders of the convention of the 
sovereign people; countermanded this authority, and prohibited 
any more copies being given. How they can justify this, even 
upon their own loose principles of government, remains to be 
seen. 

. Thus the General Assembly cannot examine the votes without 
yielding the principle contended for; and private individuals are 
not permitted to. They are thus effectually secured against ex- 
amination. 

The next vote which has been appealed to as a test, is the vote 
on the landholders' constitution in March, and it is contended, 
that the defeat of this constitution, amounted to a reafnrmance 
of the vote on the people's constitution. 

Soon after the vote on the people's constitution, the legal con- 
vention completed theirs. It extended suffrage to all native 
American citizens, upon two years residence, without any prop- 
erty or tax qualification. Foreign born citizens were required to 
possess a freehold. All who could vote under the constitution, 
were authorized to vote for or against its adoption. 

The " people's" party resolved to attempt the defeat of the 
legal constitution. The contest was of the most exciting charac- 
ter. The like of it has not been in Ehode Island within the 
writer's recollection. The result was, for the constitution, 8,013; 
against it, 8,689; total, 16,702. Majority against it, 676. 

Now, let us examine of what materials this number of 8,689, 
was composed. A large number of the freeholders voted against 
the constitution, because they were opposed to so great an exten- 
sion, and some, because they were opposed to any constitution at 
all. A large number of people in the northern part of the State 
opposed it, because too much strength in the Senate was given 
to the southern counties. Still more were influenced by the mis- 
representations circulated, in relation to the right of fishery. 
They were told, that the legal constitution abridged, or took 
away their rights on the shore, and their rights of fishery. 
There was no part of the constitution that was not fully dis- 
cussed, and every possible objection urged to suit different local- 
ities and prejudices. In allowing 1,500 to have voted from all 



60 



these considerations, we think we are very reasonable. There 
would then remain, 7,189. What a falling off from the 13,944, 
who are said to have voted for the people's constitution, in De- 
cember, 1841, only three months previous ! 

But, even all of these 7,169, did not vote against the legal 
constitution, because they wished the people's constitution to be- 
come the law of the land. It cannot be denied, for it was indus- 
triously circulated, and the impression was generally produced, 
that, as the whigs had a majority in the freemen's convention, 
the legal constitution was so framed, that its adoption would 
secure the power of the State to the whigs, or the aristocracy. 
It was considered as a whig measure, and great numbers of dem- 
ocrats voted against it for no other reason. And a report was 
circulated in the south part of the State, that Governor Fenner 
and Governor Francis, men who stood high in the confidence of 
the democratic party, had voted for the people's constitution. 
It is almost needless to say, the report was false; but numbers 
.were influenced by it. 

But even if no deductions are to be made at all, if the whole 
8,689, were supporters of the people's constitution, where were 
the rest of the 13,944? No exertion was spared to bring every 
one of their men to the polls, every argument was used, and 
every passion appealed to, as the files of the suffrage newspaper 
will show, and the people, in all parts of the State, were aroused 
and excited by means of paid lecturers, for several weeks preced- 
ing the election. The prejudices of the poor against the rich, 
were openly appealed to. The falling off can only be accounted 
for in another way. We have said, that, at the voting for the 
people's constitution, there was no challenging of votes, for 
there was no officer who had authority to administer an oath, 
and no means of preventing fraud, and also, that a considerable 
number put in votes for it, merely as an expression of opinion in 
favor of free suffrage, and not meaning that it should ever be 
the supreme law of the land. But in voting for the legal con- 
stitution, both parties were present, the votes were challenged, 
the closest scrutiny applied, and the foreign population, and 
transient persons, (of whom there is a very great number, manufac- 
turing being the leading business of the north part of the State, 
and the government works employing a great many at Newport,) 



61 



were excluded. All these had probably voted for the people's 
constitution. Besides, all those who had voted for the people's 
constitution, merely as an expression of opinion, now came for- 
ward and voted for the legal constitution, because it provided a 
very liberal extension. 

Here, then, even taking the whole number, the friends of the 
people's constitution, in March, in a town-meeting, conducted 
according to laiv, and where the voting was confined to the per- 
manent population, could only muster 8,689 votes, just about 
one-third of the male population over twenty-one. So much for 
this second test of their majority. 

The number of freemen claimed to have voted for the people's 
constitution, in December, was 4,960. The number of freemen 
*who voted against the legal constitution, in March, was about 
2,680, from examinations of the records made by the town-clerks 
of the several towns. Here, too, is a large falling off, which 
can only be accounted for in a similar manner. 

The vote for State officers, in April, 1842, was no test of any- 
thing. On the charter election-day, Governor King and his 
ticket, received 4,916 votes from both political parties. General 
Carpenter was voted for by the qualified voters of the suffrage 
party, and sby a considerable number of democrats, and received 
2,392 votes. As these elections were under the old law, none 
but freeholders voted. There was no serious opposition, and the 
strength of neither party brought out. On their election-day, 
the people's party put in over 6,500 votes for Mr. Dorr, as gov- 
ernor. There was no opposition, of course, but yet considerable 
exertion was made to get their voters out, in order to make a 
show of numbers. 

We will close this examination of the question of the majority, 
by observing, that the famous nine lawyers, in their Statement 
of Reasous, in defence of their course, do not assert that they 
ever obtained a majority. They contend for the right of the 
majority to make a constitution, and, although the whole docu- 
ment is so worded as to produce the impression that they believed 
the constitution had been adopted by a majority; yet they did 
not dare to risk their reputation upon a positive assertion of it 
as a fact. The document is thus, though perhaps unintention- 
ally, deceptive. One of the number, an able and distinguished 



62 

advocate, has since, repeatedly and publicly, expressed his doubts 
of the people's constitution ever having obtained such a majority. 
Never was there a set of men who placed a more blind confi- 
dence in their leaders, than the people's party, or more implicitly 
followed the dictation of the party organ. We have mentioned 
the fisheries, as a case, where the most gross misrepresentation 
was used, to defeat the legal constitution. The following will 
serve as another instance. It is a copy of one of the numerous 
hand-bills which were circulated, previous to the vote on that 
constitution. 

"LOOK BEFORE YOU LEAP! 

" Opinion of the Attorney -General of the United States in rela- 
tion to the deeply interesting subject in which the People of this 
State are now engaged, 

" No State in the Union has a right to form and adopt a Con- 
stitution containing any article or provision, conflicting with, or 
in contravention to the Constitution of the United States. 

"A Constitution adopted by any State of the Union contain- 
ing an article or provision conflicting with the Constitution of 
the United States, would be null and void, and of no effect, be- 
cause 

"A State Constitution to be valid, must not in any article or 
provision contained in it conflict with the Constitution of the 
United States, and must be adopted by a majority of the whole 
people of the State who possess the qualification of Electors. 

" When a Constitution is adopted, it is adopted as a ivhole — 
and any single article or provision contained in it, which is in 
contravention to the Constitution of the United States, vitiates 
the tvhole instrument; and the whole would be null and void, and 
of no effect, because it would not be determined, by any author- 
ity of the State or of the United States, whether the Constitu- 
tion could have been adopted if it had not contained an article 
or provision which induced a portion of the Electors to vote its 
adoption, who, if it had not contained such article or provision, 
would have voted its rejection. 

"Every citizen of the United States holding appointment 
under the United States or under any of the individual States 



63 



of the Union, who having bound himself by oath or affirmation 
to support the Constitution of the United States — by voting for 
the adoption of a Constitution in any State which contains a 
single article or provision in contravention to the Constitution of 
the United States would be adjudged to have violated his obli- 
gation to support the Constitution of the United States, and lay 
himself liable to the penalty of perjury. 



" The second Article of the Constitution now offered to the 
people of this State for adoption or rejection is in contravention 
of the Constitution of the United States: read and judge for 
yourselves. 

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 

"Article I, Sec. 8.— 4th Clause,— Declares the powers of 
Congress — 'To establish an Uniform rule of Naturalization 
and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the 
United States' — 

"Article 4, Sec. 2,— 1st Clause, is as follows:— 'The citizens 
of each State shall be entitled to ALL privileges and immunities 
of citizensMn the several States.' 

"Article- 6, 3d Clause, is in the following words: — 'The 
Senators and Representatives before mentioned, (of the U. States) 
and the members of the several State Legislatures, and ail exec- 
utive and judicial officers both of the United States and of the 
several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support 
the Constitution of the United States.' 

" Newport, March 19, 1842." 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



027 272 337 



